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1. INTRODUCTION
Unlike the system of trade liberalization in the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"),1 there has never been a comprehensive,
multilateral agreement on foreign investment. Binding interna-
tional initiatives on foreign investment exist largely at the bilat-
eral,2 regional,3 and sectoral4 levels. This is true despite exponen-
tial growth in rates of foreign investment and the increasing
complementariness of trade and investment as strategies for pene-
trating domestic markets.
At the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha in Qatar,
an agreement appears to have been reached to commence invest-
ment negotiations at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Mexico in
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1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Apr. 15,1994, vol. 33,33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
2 See generally RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRErE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES (1995) [hereinafter DOLZER & STEVENS] (featuring a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the use and coverage of bilateral investment treaties).
3 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, chs. 1-22, 32
LL.M. 289, 289-605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (providing the text of treaty estab-
lishing a free trade zone in North America). The member states of NAFTA are the
United States, Canada, and Mexico. The investment provisions are found in
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.
4 See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, Part I, 33 I.L.M. 381 (1995)
(providing for the liberalization of investment restrictions and investment protec-
tion amongst a large number of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) and Eastern European states within the energy sector).
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2003.5 However, it was only in 1998 that similar negotiations in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
("MAI") ended without result. The MAI provisions themselves
were heavily influenced by the detailed investment provisions in
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"). This Article will examine both of these instruments
and attempt to draw some suggestions for future investment nego-
tiations within the WTO. The Article will argue that there are es-
sentially two challenges that negotiators face in creating invest-
ment rules in the WTO.
Primarily, a WTO agreement must reflect the interests of de-
veloping countries. Historically, developing countries (largely
serving as host countries for foreign investment) have resisted ini-
tiatives to develop investment rules at the multilateral level. In-
deed, the choice of the OECD (composed mainly of developed
states) as the negotiating forum for the MAI was driven by a desire
to exclude developing countries from negotiations due to the con-
cern that the developing states' demands would dilute the MAI
commitments. However, the options for negotiation should not be
viewed in absolutist terms as either full liberalization of discrimi-
natory regulation or full protectionism. A more subtle approach is
warranted. In part, the solution lays in understanding the different
rationales and methods by which states regulate foreign invest-
ment. This Article will undertake such an analysis so as to suggest
realistic ways in which to craft a WVTO investment agreement
broadly reflective of the interests of the members of the WVTO from
the North and South.
There is also a second formidable, albeit less obvious, chal-
lenge. The NAFTA Chapter 11 model (and that of the MAI) pro-
vides for a trinity of strong investment liberalization, investment
protection, and dispute settlement provisions. In recent years,
there has been a proliferation of arbitral cases brought by investors
under NAFTA Chapter 11. The jurisprudence that has emerged
from some of these cases extends the coverage of NAFTA Chapter
11 beyond clearly discriminatory measures to seemingly legitimate
regulations with little adverse impact on foreign investors. This
raises the difficult issue of drafting a WNTO investment agreement
5 WTO, Ministerial Declaration: Ministerial Conference Fourth Session Doha,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 20 (Nov. 14, 2001), 20-22 [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Dec-
laration].
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in such a way as to preserve core components of regulatory auton-
omy. The Article will argue that WTO negotiators should not sim-
ply look to the NAFTA precedent as the only model available. In-
stead, the Article will suggest ways in which negotiators can define
commitments in a WTO initiative to avoid some of the problems
that have arisen under NAFTA Chapter 11.
This Article is organized as follows. Section 2 offers some
background material. It examines statistical evidence showing that
developing countries are largely host states for foreign investment.
It also details the shifting policy attitudes of host states towards
foreign investment and the way in which those changes have in-
fluenced the content of existing international rules on investment.
Section 3 then outlines the way in which states typically regulate
foreign investment driven by a complex mix of political and eco-
nomic motives. The analysis focuses on the common (but distor-
tive) practice of using incentives to attract foreign investors. Sec-
tion 4 examines the NAFTA Chapter 11 model and the
jurisprudence that has emerged from some of the NAFTA arbitral
cases. Section 5 examines the MAI, its heavy reliance on the
NAFTA model, and belated attempts to rectify some of the prob-
lems inherent in that model. Section 6 considers the Doha negoti-
ating agenda and prospects for concluding negotiations with a vi-
able investment agreement in the WTO. Section 6 ties together
different lines of inquiry and puts forward a series of suggestions
on the two major challenges facing WTO negotiators. Section 7
concludes the Article.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Foreign Investment in the Global Economy
The last few decades have witnessed exponential growth in
foreign investment, particularly in foreign direct investment
("FDI"). FDI is normally defined as ownership with some form of
control of all or part of a business in another country.6 The key de-
terminant is that the foreign investor has a degree of managerial
6 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 408
(4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter IMF] ("[FDI] is made to acquire a lasting interest in an
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of an investor, the investor's
purpose being to have an effective choice in the management of the enterprise.").
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control over the business.7 The relatively long-term nature of FDI
is often distinguished from portfolio investment where a foreign
investor purchases securities or debt instruments without the de-
sire to control or manage the domestic firm.
8
Global FDI inflows rose from U.S. $202 billion in 1990 to U.S.
$1.27 trillion in 2000.9 Most FDI originates from and is destined for
developed countries. In fact, within the developed world, the so-
called "Triad" consisting of the European Union ("EU"), the
United States and Japan, accounted for seventy-one percent of
global FDI inflows in 2000.10 These countries also account for most
of the world's outflows of FDI with eighty-two percent of global
outflows coming from the Triad countries in 2000.11 This concen-
tration is also evidenced by the fact that about ninety of the world's
largest 100 non-financial transnational corporations (a primary
mechanism for delivering FDI) are headquartered in the Triad
countries. 12
In comparison, developing countries accounted for only nine-
teen percent of global FDI inflows in 2000.13 This represents a de-
cline since 1994, when the share of those countries accounted for
7 However, there are differences in the approaches taken by various interna-
tional economic organizations in setting the quantum of managerial control in or-
der for an investment to qualify as FDI. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT 8 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter OECD]
The numerical guideline of ownership of ten percent of ordinary shares
or voting stock determines the existence of a direct investment relation-
ship. An effective voice in the management, as evidenced by an owner-
ship of at least ten percent, implies that the direct investor is able to in-
fluence or participate in the management of an enterprise; it does not
require absolute control by the foreign investor.
Id. But cf. IMF, supra note 6, 411-3 (finding that the required quantum of control
may vary depending on whether ownership in the enterprise is concentrated or
diffused).
8 IMF, supra note 6, T 409 ("In contrast, portfolio investors are primarily con-
cerned about the safety of their capital, the likelihood of an appreciation in its
value, and the return that it is bringing them. They will evaluate the prospects
separately... and may often shift their capital with changes in these prospects.").
9 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD),
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001: PROMOTING LINKAGES 10 (2001) [hereinafter
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001].
10 Id. at 9.
11 Id.
12 Id. at xv.
13 Id. at 9.
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forty-one percent of global FDI inflows.14 Also, flows of FDI are
heavily concentrated within particular parts of the developing
world. Of the U.S. $240 billion of FDI flows into the developing
world in 2000, U.S. $64 billion went to Hong Kong (China) and U.S.
$41 billion to China.' 5 In comparison, Africa remained severely
marginalized as a host continent for FDI with its share in total in-
flows falling below one percent.16 Developing countries also re-
main largely capital importers or host states for FDI. They only ac-
counted for approximately eight percent of FDI outflows in 1999.17
From the perspective of a possible WTO investment agreement,
there is also a close relationship between foreign investment and
trade. Intra-firm trade among transnational corporations ("TNCs")
accounts for approximately one-third of world trade while TNC
exports to non-affiliated entities account for another one-third of
world trade.' 8 There is increased recognition that trade and FDI
are two ways of servicing foreign markets. They are sometimes
employed alternatively, but increasingly, they are used as com-
plementary modes of servicing foreign markets. This trend is
probably best recognized in the WTO General Agreement on Trade
in Services ("GATS"), which includes the concept of "commercial
presence" in the definition of trade in services (recognizing that
FDI is a prerequisite for exporting many services).19
Despite the growth in FDI and its linkage to trade, developing
countries (as net capital importers or host states for FDI) are not
naturally demandeurs of multilateral investment rules. In fact, dur-
ing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") Uru-
gnay Round negotiations from 1986 to 1994, a number of develop-
ing countries opposed a U.S. proposal to include a comprehensive
investment agreement on the negotiating agenda. Consequently,
the United States reacted by advocating investment negotiations
under the aegis of the OECD in the early 1990s. While the tension
14 Id.
15 Id. at xiii-xiv.
16 Id.
17 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND
ACQUISMONS AND DEVELOPMENT 20, fig. 1.9 (2000) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2000].
18 WTO, ANNUAL REPORT 1996 44 (1996).
19 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15,1994, Final Act Embody-
ing the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Annex
1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 33, 33 I.L.M. 1167
(1994) [hereinafter GATS].
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between North and South has characterized much of the history of
international rulemaking on foreign investment, the policy per-
spectives between North and South have remained neither abso-
lute nor static. The next Section will examine the shifting policy
pendulum on foreign investment and the way in which it has in-
fluenced the content of the existing international framework on
foreign investment.
2.2. International Investment Rules: A Fragmented Landscape
In recent years, investment has often been debated as one of the
new issues for a future WTO negotiating agenda. However, the
first attempt to create multilateral treaty-based rules on foreign in-
vestment can be traced back to the immediate post-Second World
War period. In 1948, the Charter for an International Trade Or-
ganization ("ITO") was presented to a meeting of fifty-six states in
Havana.20 The ITO was to have been the third pillar of post-war
economic cooperation together with the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank.21
Despite the opposition of developing countries, the U.S. delega-
tion eventually succeeded in including provisions within the ITO
Charter dealing with foreign investment.22 However, the rights
20 For excerpts from the Havana Charter, see UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 3 (1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS] (detailing the attempted creation of an international
framework).
21 It is instructive to note that, whilst many of the Havana Charter provisions
dealt with trade liberalization (Chapter IV), there were also provisions on em-
ployment (Chapter II), development (Chapter III), restrictive business practices
(Chapter V), and agriculture (Chapter VI). This reflected a conception of the ITO
as a regime to advance economic liberalization but within a broader regulatory
context. The regulatory dimension of the ITO appears to be linked to the concept
of the regulatory state embodied in President Roosevelt's New Deal. With the
eventual demise of the ITO, the role of regulation has come to be primarily
viewed more as a domestic rather than a multilateral concern. See generally Ann-
Marie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projec-
tion of the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY
AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 125 (John Ruggie ed., 1993) (discussing the
New Deal's influence in an international context).
22 For an overview of the negotiations leading towards the Havana Charter,
see CLAIRE WILcOx, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 37-50 (1949) (discussing the
preparations, issues, and significance of Havana). See also Daniel M. Price & P.
Bryan Christy, III, Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS): Limita-
tions and Prospects for the Future, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE
MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21sT CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION 439, 443-45 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996) (discussing how "the inter-
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eventually granted to foreign investors in the Charter were sub-
stantially diluted from earlier articles put forward by the United
States.23 From the perspective of the American business commu-
nity, the overall structure of the Charter appeared to favor host
over home countries. There was particular objection by the Ameri-
can business community to the Charter provisions regulating anti-
competitive behavior by private enterprises.24 These objections
were a major reason for the eventual failure of the U.S. Senate to
ratify the Charter. As the United States accounted for roughly half
of world trade at that time, the ITO became, in effect, stillborn, and
the entire ITO project was subsequently abandoned.
In the aftermath of the defeat of the Charter, GATT (a tempo-
rary measure of the ITO) was the only body left standing. The
GAT]T was drawn up and signed as an interim tariff reduction
agreement in 1947, intended to operate until the ITO was formally
established. The GAT]T made no attempt to deal with foreign in-
vestment issues. This institutional separation of trade from in-
vestment issues in the multilateral arena continued until the Urn-
guay Round in the 1980s. Indeed, the failure of the ITO marked a
shift away from multilateralism in the coverage of investment in-
struments. By the late 1960s, bilateral investment treaties ("BITs")
had become the primary instruments for reaching agreement on
ests of developing countries ... dominated [Havana] Charter provisions on in-
vestments").
23 The early articles proposed by the U.S. delegation at a meeting in Geneva
in 1947 set out extensive rights for investors including the obligation of host states
to accord national treatment as well as unqualified most-favored-nation treat-
ment. These extensive rights provoked opposition by a number of countries, in-
cluding the Czech government, which refused to give German investors the same
status as other foreign investors. This is a very early illustration of the point
(which will be raised later in this Article) that national regulation of foreign in-
vestment is often motivated by overtly sovereignty-related concerns. The result-
ing compromise is reflected in Article 12 of the ITO Charter, which significantly
dilutes the liberalization commitments proposed by the U.S. delegation. For ex-
ample, Article 12(2) merely requires member states to "give due regard to the de-
sirability of avoiding discrimination as between foreign investments." See
INTERNATIONAL INVESM= INSTRUMENTS, supra note 20, at Annex A (reproducing
investment related provisions in regional free trade and integration agreements);
THOMAS L. BREWER & STEPHEN YOUNG, THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT SYSTEM AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 67 (1998) [hereinafter BREWER & YOUNG] (discussing
the Czech government's objection to granting equal status to German investors).
24 See Sylvia Ostry, Looking Back to Look Forward: The Multilateral Trading Sys-
tem After 50 Years, in FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 97 (2000) (detailing American objections to the regulation
of the anti-competitive behavior of private enterprises).
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foreign investment between developed and developing countries. 25
As many developing countries gained political independence, rates
of expropriation of foreign investment increased markedly.26 De-
veloped states sought ways in which to protect their investors from
the increased threat of expropriation. The conclusion of BITs be-
tween developed and developing countries became a primary tool
for effectuating this goal. A core component of most BITs are
strong provisions on investment protection and particularly, the
guarantee of compensation by the host state in the event of expro-
priation of investment.27 Despite the reduction in expropriatory
behavior in recent years, 28 the exceptionally strong investment pro-
tection provisions in later initiatives such as NAFTA and the MAI
continue to reflect the preoccupation with the hostile attitude of
developing countries towards foreign investment in the late 1960s.
By the end of the 1970s, the international policy landscape on
investment had shifted with a particular impact on developing
countries. The debt crisis of the 1980s limited the supply of loan
finance to excessively indebted developing states and made FDI a
more desirable source of foreign capital. In addition, the process of
developing states acquiring control over their natural resources
had progressed since the immediate post-war period and was no
longer a strong priority. The risk of large-scale expropriation of
foreign investment in these countries significantly diminished.
29
25 See generally UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT,
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLIcY ARRANGEMENTS 147-48, figs. V.2-V.3 (1996)
[hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996] (charting the exponential growth of
BITs from 1959 to 1996). From under 200 BITs completed by the end of the 1960s,
the number of BITs had grown to a total of 1941 at the end of 2000. WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2001, supra note 9, at 6-7.
26 BREWER & YOUNG, supra note 23, at 53. Table 2.3 summarizes trends in ex-
propriation from 1960 to 1992. For example, the mean number of expropriations
in 1960-64 was 11, in 1965-69 it was 16, in 1970-74 it was 51, in 1975-79 it was 34, in
1980-84 it was 3, in 1985-89 it was 0.4, and in 1990-92 it was 0.
27 For a discussion of the typical investment protection provisions in BITs
that provide for compensation in the event of expropriation, see DOLZER &
STEVENS, supra note 2, at 97-117.
28 See supra text accompanying note 26. See generally Michael S. Minor, The
Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy 1980-1992, 25 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 177 (1994) (discussing the reduction of expropriation amongst developing
countries).
29 For evidence of the decline in direct expropriatory behavior, see supra text
accompanying note 26. Threats to expropriate foreign investment, however, con-
tinue to occur on occasion. A recent example was the threat by President Robert
Mugabe of Zimbabwe to expropriate foreign-owned mines in the lead-up to Zim-
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Indeed, contemporary independence movements have even begun
to forge links with foreign investors to ensure economic viability in
the event that an independent state is formed as a result of their
movement.30 Thus, the interests of developing countries have
shifted away from an attitude of hostility regarding foreign inves-
tors towards the need to attract and retain FDI. At the national
level, numerous countries were taking unilateral steps to liberalize
restrictions on the entry and operation of FDI.31 In recent years,
especially since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, developing
countries have found FDI to be more stable than short-term portfo-
lio investment and bank lending. FDI inflows remained almost
unchanged during the crisis in the five most seriously affected
Asian countries, when other private capital flows, such as bank
loans and debt securities, fell dramatically. 32 The trend of liberali-
zation at the national level was also mirrored at the bilateral level.
The 1990s witnessed the strongest growth in the conclusion of
babwe's parliamentary elections in June 2000. Ed O'Loughlin, Mugabe Turns His
Sights to Business, AGE (Melbourne, Austl.), June 17, 2000, at 27.
30 This was evidenced in the recent discussions between the Council of OPM
(Free Papua Organization) -which is campaigning for independence for the In-
donesian province of Irian Jaya-and investors in Irian Jaya including Freeport
(one of the world's largest mining companies). The attitude of OPM towards in-
vestors and investor certainty in Irian Jaya is illustrated by the following state-
ment by Mr. Franzalbert Joku, the international moderator for OPM:
We are talking about establishing a modem and viable State, and to do
that we have to deal with developers. Any sensible leader would want
to see such relationships continue. We are already holding discussions
with Freeport and other investors, present and potential. The business
world is very sensitive to the kind of events unfolding in West Papua
and wants to see its interests protected. We shall do everything possible,
in our power and within reason, to see this happens.
Rowan Callick, Independence Leader Forges Links with Foreign Investors, AusT. FIN.
REV., Jan. 12, 2001, at 24.
31 See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1999: FOREIGN DiREcr
INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 115 (1999) [hereinafter WORLD
INvESTMENT REPORT 1999]. Table IV.1 charts the changes in national regulation of
FDI in various developed and developing countries from 1991 to 1998. The table
shows that 94% of the regulatory changes made during this period were in the di-
rection of creating a more favorable environment for FDI. But within this broad
trend, there can exist a gulf between the form and effect of the liberalization
measure. For example, in Laos, the government recently lifted a rule requiring
every foreign investment-no matter how small-to be approved by the Prime
Minister. Despite this change, regulatory approvals for foreign investment pro-
jects in Laos still typically take over a year to complete. Wayne Arnold, Mining
Gold in Laos Where Bombs Once Rained, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,2002, at C8.
32 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1999, supra note 31, at 9,20-23.
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BITs. The total number of BITs had reached 1941 by the end of
2000.
33
The 1990s were also characterized by a strong push to conclude
regional rules to liberalize investment flows. Of these various re-
gional initiatives, NAFTA Chapter 11 is notable for setting ex-
tremely high standards for investment liberalization, investment
protection, and dispute settlement. By comparison, little attention
was given to investment issues at the multilateral level until the
mid-1980s. An attempt by the United States to include investment
on the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations (1973-1979) failed due to
the opposition of developing countries.34 In the lead-up to the
Punta del Este GATT Ministerial Meeting in March 1986, the
United States again put forward a proposal for a comprehensive
agreement on investment in the GATT.35 This approach was re-
sisted by developing countries36 with the resulting compromise to
limit negotiations to "trade-related investment measures." Devel-
oping countries (with some exceptions) also opposed the U.S. pro-
posal to include trade in services in the negotiations.37 However,
these countries eventually agreed to the inclusion of trade in ser-
vices in the Punta del Este declaration on condition that negotia-
tions in that area would take place on a separate track from those
on goods, with a clear development orientation.
38
33 See supra text accompanying note 25.
34 See BREWER & YOUNG, supra note 23, at 122 ("Despite its efforts, however,
the USA was not successful in getting investment issues on the agenda of the
GATT Tokyo Round Negotiations (1973-79). Developing countries had been par-
ticularly resistant .. ").
35 See generally THE GAT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HIsTORY 2069
(Terence P. Steward ed., 1993) [hereinafter GAT URUGUAY ROUND]
(On June 10, 1986, the United States introduced a proposed text for the
ministerial declaration on investment. This document reviewed the im-
portance of investment issues to international trade; past GAT actions
related to investment measures... the competence of the GAT to estab-
lish and oversee a multilateral agreement on investment measures, as
well as proposals to define the scope of an agreement.).
36 See id. at 2070 ("The goals of the [first draft ministerial declaration] reflect
the views of several South American and other developing countries already pre-
sented to the Preparatory Committee, namely that GAT negotiations should be
restricted to trade in goods, not services, or policy-related issues such as invest-
ment regulation and intellectual property rights.").
37 GAT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 35, at 2354-58.
38 See Murray Gibbs & Mina Mashayekhi, The Uruguay Round Negotiations on
Investment: Lessons for the Future 16 (UNCTAD, May 14, 1998) (discussing devel-
oping countries' concessions in the Punta del Este declaration).
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By the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994, only
two of the final fifty legal instruments to result included direct
provisions dealing with foreign investment issues. These were the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 39 ("TRIMS
Agreement") and the GATS. 40 Both of these agreements only deal
with investment in a fragmented manner adopting an issue- or sec-
tor-specific approach. The TRIMS Agreement focuses only on the
imposition of certain performance requirements on an investor af-
ter entry into the host state. Whilst the GATS ostensibly pertains to
"trade in services," 41 it also contains detailed provisions concerning
foreign investment. This reflects the fact that FDI tends to be espe-
cially important in service industries, as it is a way for firms to en-
ter and service a foreign market. Indeed, "trade in services" is de-
fined as including the supply of services "by a service supplier of
one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any
other Member." 42 FDI, through "commercial presence," is thereby
included as one of the modes of supply of services covered by the
GATS.
The system that emerged by the mid-1990s can be thus de-
scribed as a patchwork of international rules on foreign invest-
ment. Strong provisions on investment liberalization and protec-
tion are particularly evident at the bilateral and regional levels.
The emphasis on investment protection in these instruments re-
flects the hostile attitude of host states and the attendant expropria-
tory behavior evident in the late 1960s. Since then, developing
countries have adopted a more welcoming attitude to FDI as a
source of development capital. However, the Uruguay Round ne-
gotiations evidence the traditional resistance of developing coun-
tries towards attempts to include investment on the GATT/WTO
negotiating agenda. This is perhaps not altogether surprising
given the record of increasing investment flows that do not appear
to correlate to the absence of multilateral rules on investment.
The next Section will examine the way in which states typically
regulate the entry and operation of investors. The central focus
39 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, April 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS], available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs.e/legaLe/18-trims.pdf.
40 GATS, supra note 19.
41 Id. art. I(1).
42 Id. art. I(2)(c).
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will be to identify what potential advantages would accrue to de-
veloping states from the liberalization of these regulatory measures
in a potential WTO investment agreement.
3. HOST STATE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The range of policies used by host states to regulate foreign in-
vestment is immense. Once a foreign investor enters into a host
state, it becomes subject-like any domestic party-to the full
range of regulatory measures passed by the host state. But within
this broad category, there are normally measures that discriminate
(in a positive or negative sense) between foreign and domestic par-
ticipants in the market. These discriminatory measures are what
most international investment agreements attempt to discipline.
However, as Section 4 of this Article will show, foreign investors
have become recently active under Chapter 11 of NAFTA in chal-
lenging even seemingly non-discriminatory regulatory measures.
At this stage, it is possible to categorize most discriminatory
forms of national regulation of foreign investment into one of three
categories: (i) pre-admission restrictions on establishment of for-
eign investment; (ii) post-admission restrictions once the foreign
investor has entered the host state; and (iii) incentives to attract
foreign investors into the host state. Vastly different rationales ex-
ist for imposing these different categories of restrictive measures.
WTO negotiators will need to carefully consider these different ra-
tionales as a means in which to judge the political appetite of
member states to the depth of coverage of a WTO investment
agreement.
3.1. Pre-Admission Restrictions: The Political Sphere
States have traditionally imposed restrictions over the admis-
sion of foreign goods, services, and capital. In recent years, the
GATT and later WTO agreements have significantly reduced barri-
ers to trade in goods (such as tariffs) and to a lesser extent, barriers
to trade in services. Despite this powerful trend towards trade lib-
eralization, states at all stages of the development process still re-
tain some restrictions on the admission of foreign investors. These
restrictions can take various forms, 43 such as closing certain sectors
43 For a comprehensive list of the myriad of forms of restrictions on admis-
sion, see WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 25, at 176-77.
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of a nation's economy to FDI, 44 quantitative restrictions on the
number of foreign investors admitted into a specific sector, and
screening and registration procedures.45 These admission restric-
tions are often connected to sovereignty concerns based on the per-
ceived harm believed to flow from ownership of a country's pro-
ductive resources by foreign investors. These political concerns
cannot be understated and apply to host states at all stages of de-
velopment (albeit at different levels).
Even some developed states still exclude the entry of FDI into
strategic sectors such as media, publishing and films, and other
core industries involved in national defense and security.46 These
restrictions are more substantive for developing countries because
many of these countries only began to orientate their domestic
policies toward FDI in the late 1970s. For developing countries, the
tension between modernizing their economies through the admis-
sion of foreign investment and the desire to retain control over
strategic economic sectors is a constant one.47 This raises an impor-
44 For example, the version of the Indonesian Negative Investment List is-
sued by Presidential Decree on July 2,1998, excludes foreign investment in sectors
such as freshwater fish, forest utilization, local shipping, taxi and bus transport,
and medical services. See OECD PROCEEDINGS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
RECOVERY IN SOUTHEAST AsIA (1999).
45 For example, proposals by foreign investors to invest in Australia over cer-
tain monetary thresholds require notification to the Australian Foreign Invest-
ment Review Board. That Board will examine proposals to acquire existing busi-
ness (with total assets over AUD $50 million) and will raise no objection to a
proposal unless it is "contrary to the national interest." Foreign Acquisitions and
Takeovers Act, 1975, c. §§ 18-21a (Austl.) (and accompanying Ministerial state-
ments).
46 For a comprehensive analysis of the exclusion of national defense and se-
curity sectors from the entry of FDI into the United States, see MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HowsE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 342-44
(2d ed. 1999); David Scott Nance & Jessica Wasserman, Regulation of Imports and
Foreign Investment in the United States on National Security Grounds, 11 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 926 (1990).
47 For a very recent example of this tension, see Tim Weiner, As National Oil
Giant Struggles, Mexico Agonizes over Opening It to Foreign Ventures, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2002, at 6. After nationalization of Mexico's oil operations in 1938, the
Mexican Constitution was amended to forbid foreign exploitation of its oil and
gas reserves. Mexico's state-run energy company, Pemex, was at one time a sym-
bol of nationalistic pride. "Schoolchildren still learn that the creation of Pemex
after the oil expropriation was the culmination of their nation's independence."
Id. But, in recent years, it has also been used as a source of lucrative funds for the
Mexican government. Taxes and duties on Pemex finance more than one-third of
the Mexican federal budget. Faced with increasing pollution and a poor safety
record, the current President, Vicente Fox, is considering modernizing the com-
pany by allowing some foreign participation. But the opposition to change at Pe-
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tant but sometimes overlooked point. In the realm of foreign in-
vestment, political and economic considerations interact very
closely. Put simply, foreign investment (as a means of long-term
ownership of national assets and resources) is much more politi-
cally sensitive than foreign trade.48 This political sensitivity is
heightened by the manner in which liberalization is effected in the
foreign investment sphere. Trade restrictions, such as tariffs, can
be reduced incrementally, and the value of those reductions can be
translated relatively easily into a common denominator.49 This is
much more difficult in the context of regulatory impediments to
foreign investors.
These sovereignty concerns have shaped the structure of most
pre-MAI investment agreements. Within most international in-
vestment regimes, it is generally only Chapter 11 of NAFTA and
BITs involving the United States that explicitly apply the non-
discriminatory norms of national and most-favored-nation treat-
ment to the entry of foreign investment.5 0 In contrast, most non-
U.S. BITs reserve the right of the host state to regulate the entry of
foreign investors and only apply liberalization conditions to the
post-establishment phase of the investment process. 51
mex remains a powerful force with the fear that Mexico's prime natural resource
might once again be used to enrich foreigners.
48 This point is argued forcefully by A.V. Ganesan, a former Commerce Secre-
tary to the Government of India. See A.V. Ganesan, Developing Countries and a Pos-
sible Multilateral Framework on Investment: Strategic Options 7 (2) TRANSNAT'L CORP.
1 (1998).
49 For an overview of the mechanics, negotiating techniques, and reciprocity
criterion for reducing tariffs, see BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND
122-33 (2001).
50 NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1102-04. Under these articles, each NAFTA state
must provide the better of national and most-favored-nation treatment to inves-
tors of another NAFTA state "with respect to the establishment, acquisition, man-
agement, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments" (em-
phasis added). The reference to "establishment, acquisition" explicitly includes
the admission phase of the investment process.
51 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mar. 14,1994,
Ind.-U.K., vol. 34, 34 I.L.M. 935, 941. Unlike NAFTA, under Article 4(1) of this
BIT, there is no explicit reference to wording such as "establishment" or "acquisi-
tion." Instead, each contracting party is required to provide national treatment to
investments of investors of the other party dealing with "their operation, man-
agement, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal by such investors." See DOLZER
& STEVENS, supra note 2, at 53-85 (examining the differences in the treatment of
admission of foreign investors in various BITs); INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE: A COMPENDIUM 19 (1999).
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3.2. Post-Admission Restrictions: Capturing Economic Gains
Once a foreign investor is permitted to enter the host state, re-
strictions can still be imposed on the ownership or operation of the
foreign investment. But most of these restrictions are designed to
capture the economic benefits of the investment process rather
than on sovereignty grounds. The range of post-admission restric-
tions is enormous,5 2 and it encompasses techniques as diverse as
compulsory joint ventures with host state participation to perform-
ance requirements on the operation of the foreign investment. Per-
formance requirements deserve particular emphasis given their in-
clusion in the TRIMS Agreement. These are conditions imposed on
investors (often linked to the grant of an incentive by the host
state), such as local content requirements (mandating that products
produced by the investor in the host state contain a certain level of
local materials), the employment of local personnel, and manda-
tory technology transfer (often through compulsory licensing re-
quirements).
53
As a home state for many of the world's TNCs, it is not particu-
larly suprising that the United States has long been an advocate for
the elimination of performance requirements. 54 In fact, the eco-
nomic case for liberalizing these restrictions is, on first view, very
strong. Some performance requirements may restrict economic
growth in host states by acting as a disincentive to the entry of in-
vestors. For example, a common objective in imposing joint ven-
ture requirements on the entry of investors is the hope of achieving
greater technology transfer to host states. One effect of this re-
quirement is that it may discourage investors whose proprietary
technology is a significant asset and one which they are reluctant to
share with other (and potentially rival) firms. A large body of re-
search has found that these requirements do not in fact lead to the
objective of enhancing the transfer of technology to the host state.55
52 For a detailed list, see WORLD INvEsTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 25, at
177-79.
-53 TRIMS, supra note 39.
54 See, e.g., COMMISSION ON U.S.-PAcIFIc TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY,
BUILDING AMERICAN PROSPERITY IN THE 21st CENTURY: U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
IN THE ASIA PAcIc REGION 20-22 (1997) [hereinafter BUILDING AMERICAN
PROSPERITY] (criticizing various performance requirements imposed by Japan,
China, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, and the Philippines).
55 For a summary of the empirical work conducted by economists on the ef-
fect of performance requirements, see Theodore H. Moran, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and Development: A Reassessment of the Evidence and Policy Implications,
727
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
The research shows that technology transferred to joint ventures is
significantly older, and the speed of upgrading is slower than to
wholly-owned subsidiaries of investors.56 But the evidence is not
absolute for all forms of performance requirements.57 In contrast,
local content requirements are often imposed in an attempt to de-
velop clusters of industries in a given country.58 These clusters are
groups of industries that are interdependent, and according to a
prominent theory of industrial competitiveness, contribute signifi-
cantly to a host state's economic development.59 When an investor
enters a host state, it may continue to simply source its inputs from
its home base. The imposition of local content requirements is of-
ten intended to counteract this tendency by ensuring that clusters
of local manufacturers (supporting the foreign investor's activities)
develop in the host state.
Whilst this is by no means an exhaustive analysis of the eco-
nomic effects of the large range of performance requirements, it
does militate against the conceptual trap of treating all of these re-
quirements as welfare-reducing for both home and host states. In-
deed, it is clear that some developing countries have underesti-
mated the relatively limited impact of the Uruguay Round TRIMS
Agreement on their use of performance requirements.60 In the con-
Article presented at the OECD Conference on the Role of International Investment
in Development, Corporate Responsibilities and the OECD Guidelines for the
Multinational Enterprises (Sept. 20-21, 1999).
56 Id.
57 For an analysis of situations in which export performance requirements
may increase host state welfare, see Dani Rodrik, The Economics of Export-
Performance Requirements, 102 Q. J. ECON. 633 (1987) (analyzing the resource alloca-
tion and welfare effects of export performance requirements imposed on foreign
investors). See also Patrick Low & Arvind Subramanian, Beyond TRIMS: A Case for
Multilateral Action on Investment Rules and Competition Policy?, in THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 380-88 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters
eds., 1996).
58 See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 46, at 338-39.
59 Id.
60 The Annex to the TRIMS Agreement sets out an "Illustrative List" of per-
formance requirements that are inconsistent with the agreement. The agreement
provides for notification, national treatment, and the phased elimination of this
limited set of performance requirements. In early 2000 (which marked the expira-
tion of the transition period for the elimination of TRIMS for developing coun-
tries), a group of developing countries began to lobby the WTO Council for Trade
in Goods for an extension to the transition period. In July 2001, an agreement was
reached whereby the requests of nine countries- Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ma-
laysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, and Thailand-were to be
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text of a future WTO investment agreement, it is likely that devel-
oping countries will resist strengthened disciplines in this area
without some corresponding concession to their interests in the
Doha negotiations. Section 6 of this Article will examine the scope
of the Doha agenda to deliver concessions to developing countries
in issues other than investment. Aside from this sort of cross-issue
linkage as a means of achieving consensus in the Doha negotia-
tions, the WTO negotiators will also need to consider possible in-
tra-issue tradeoffs within the general topic of investment. One
possible solution may be to link further disciplines on post-
admission restrictions in a WTO investment agreement with new
disciplines on the use of investment incentives by host states.61 The
role of investment incentives in national investment policies and
the relative disadvantage of developing countries in the use of in-
centives is considered next.
3.3. Incentives: A Competitive Dilemma
Incentives to attract investors into the host state are often
linked to performance requirements by host states. In other words,
they act as an economic carrot to sweeten the imposition of the
stick.62 The range of incentives offered by host states is extensive.
However, there are broadly two main categories-fiscal incentives
(whose objective is often to reduce the tax burden for an investor
by, for example, reducing the standard corporate income tax rate)
and financial incentives (which normally involve the provision of
funds directly to the investor in the form of direct subsidies, loan
guarantees, or export credits).63 Developed states normally favor
the use of financial incentives over fiscal ones, in part because fiscal
incentives generally require change to domestic legislation and
granted extensions to be approved by the Goods Council by October 2001. How-
ever, opposition from the United States and Canada to the detail of the Malaysian
and Colombian plans to phase out non-conforming measures prevented an
agreement from being reached in October 2001. Rift over Malaysia, Colombia Holds
Up Approval of TRIMS Extensions 19 (42) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 11, 12 (Oct. 19, 2001).
61 This type of grand bargain has oft been mooted, but, because of its impor-
tance, it deserves reconsideration and analysis. E.V.K. Fitzgerald, Developing
Countries and Multilateral Investment Negotiations, in MULTILATERAL REGULATION OF
INvErMENT 60-62 (E.C. Nieuwenhuys & M.M.T.A. Brus eds., 2001).
62 For a useful analysis of the linkage between performance requirements and
investment incentives at the national level, see Rachel McCulloch, Investment Poli-
cies in the GATT, 13 WORLD ECON. 541,545-48 (1990).
63 For a concise summary of the range of incentives used by host states, see
WORLD INvESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 25, at 180.
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hence parliamentary approval. In contrast, developing states tend
to prefer the use of fiscal incentives, as they generally lack the re-
sources needed to provide direct financial incentives.64
There are various theoretical arguments used by host states to
justify the issue of incentives.65 In particular, host states view the
use of these incentives as a means of influencing the decisions of
investors to locate in a particular region. The assumption is that
this relocation can lead to associated investments by other inves-
tors, thus creating roll-on benefits for the host state. Ultimately,
however, these incentives may only be successful to the extent that
they succeed in attracting investment from one state into another.
As such, there is a real risk of competition amongst states in the use
of incentives.66 In such competition, it is obviously the poorer
countries that are relatively disadvantaged. In a bidding contest
using fiscal and financial incentives, the winner is likely to be the
country that has the "deepest pockets."67 The use of incentives can
thereby act to distort the allocation of global FDI (based, in part, on
the comparative advantages of host states), particularly discrimi-
nating against developing countries. Somewhat ironically, the
empirical evidence suggests that incentives only play a limited role
in the decisions of investors to invest among different states.68 In
64 A typical example of the use of fiscal incentives occurred recently in Laos
to attract the development of a gold mine by Oxiana Resources, a small Australian
mining company. See Arnold, supra note 31, at C8
(As incentives, Laos has exempted Oxiana from corporate taxes for two
years as well as its employees from having to pay income taxes. It has
waived duties on imported equipment and is permitting Oxiana to hire a
customs official to be posted on site, eliminating long waits for ship-
ments at the border.).
65 For a theoretical analysis of the use of incentives, see UNCTAD, INCENTIVES
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 9-16 (1996) [hereinafter INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT].
66 For example, during the course of 1996-2000, General Motors entered into
negotiations for the construction of a new U.S. $250 million engine plant with five
possible suitors: Brazil, Germany, Sweden, and two Australian sub-federal states,
South Australia and Victoria. Towards the end of negotiations, only Victoria and
South Australia remained as suitors. Eventually, Victoria's bid of U.S. $30 million
(in comparison to South Australia's bid of U.S. $12 million) succeeded in attract-
ing General Motors to locate the plant in Victoria. Holden's Decision, AGE (Mel-
bourne, Austl.), Dec. 14, 2000, at 4.
67 INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 65, at 14.
68 In a 1984 survey of 52 TNCs, out of 19 factors identified by TNCs as
influencing their decision to invest in a host state, incentives offered by the host
state ranked seventh in importance for investments in developing states and
eighth in developed states. GROUP OF THIRTY, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 1973-
1987: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES (1984). See also INCENTIVES AND
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this respect, instead of enabling wealthy countries to attract inves-
tors, some incentives may simply act as a form of wealth transfer
from the host state to the investor.
Unlike the restrictions considered earlier, there are effectively
no rules at the international level to discipline the use of invest-
ment incentives.69 The foregoing analysis suggests clear benefits to
developing countries in the negotiation of rules limiting the use of
incentives given their relative disadvantage in any bidding context
using incentives. But, given political realities, it will be more diffi-
cult for developed countries to agree to such rules.70 If the devel-
oped world simply accepts the economic evidence of the distortive
effects of incentives, then incentive competition would constitute a
"prisoner's dilemma" for the world as a whole (instead of only im-
plying losses for developing countries). In turn, this would create
impetus for all states to act co-operatively to design rules limiting
the use of incentives.
But it is more likely that developed countries will continue to
oppose the inclusion of incentives in negotiations rules on FDI.
Aside from the perceived success of incentives in some developed
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES (1984). See also INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 65, at 10 (discussing using incentives to attract
TNCs); Edward M. Graham, Trade and Investment in the I/TO: Just Do It', in
LAUNcING NEW GLOBAL TRADE TALKS: AN ACTION AGENDA 151-64 Ueffrey J.
Schott ed., 1998). But cf. Bernard Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, From TRIMS to a WTO
Agreement on Investment?, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRO-ACrIVE
AGENDA 206-07 (Bernard Hoekman & Will Martin eds., 2000) (questioning the ra-
tionale for disciplines on all incentives).
69 OECD, THE OECD DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 1976 (OECD, Working Paper No. 20, 1997) (as re-
viewed and amended). This Declaration comprises a Statement on National
Treatment, a Statement on International Investment Incentives and Disincentives
and a set of voluntary Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. "The Statement
on International Incentives and Disincentives enables a member state to consult
with another member state when it considers that its interests may be adversely
affected by the impact of... official incentives and disincentives to international
direct investment." However, to date, little consultation has taken place, as few
OECD states have wanted to take the competitive risk of exposing their use of in-
centives. See generally OECD, THE OECD DECLARATION AND DECISIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: 1991 REVIEW (1992).
70 One particular aspect of the political sensitivity of developed states to dis-
ciplines on the use of incentives arose in the MAI negotiations. The United States
opposed the inclusion of the use of sub-national incentives in the negotiations on
the basis that it could (or should not) bind state governments to obligations re-
garding incentives. See Graham, supra note 68, at 153.
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home states,71 the political economy aspect of this issue would
most likely see the business community of developed home states
(as losers from such rules) lobby vigorously against this proposal.
A more realistic approach to limits on incentives is that of, at least
in perception, a zero-sum game that would increase welfare in de-
veloping countries but reduce welfare in developed states.
However, there is still clearly room in a WTO initiative to cre-
ate an incentive for WTO members to cooperate in this area. In es-
sence, this would involve linking disciplines on incentives to that
of performance requirements. An offer by developed states to con-
sider rules on incentives could act as a powerful inducement for
developing countries in turn to agree to other restrictions in such a
general agreement. This type of reciprocal, intra-issue linkage is
precisely what may be needed to overcome the resistance by de-
veloping countries to general rules on investment.
Reciprocity within and across issues is not the only strategy
that will need to be pursued by negotiators to guarantee the suc-
cess of any WTO investment agreement. Aside from disciplines on
directly discriminatory measures such as those explored above, the
WTO negotiators will also need to consider the delicate balance be-
tween investment rules and legitimate regulatory measures with
an incidental impact on foreign investors. The difficulty in draw-
ing a line between effective investment rules and broader host state
regulatory autonomy is best illustrated by on-going difficulties
under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. These will be considered next.
4. THE NAFTA CHAPTER 11 MODEL
In considering prospects for a WTO investment agreement, an
analysis of Chapter 11 of NAFTA is essential for three reasons.
First, NAFTA Chapter 11 contains the most detailed and compre-
hensive rules on foreign investment in any international treaty.
Second, the drafters of the MAI relied heavily on the NAFTA pro-
visions when formulating the substantive provisions of the MAI.
This leads to the obvious point that the WTO member states are
likely to look to the NAFTA experience when considering whether
and how to negotiate WTO investment rules. Third, there has been
an explosion in recent years in the number of arbitral challenges
71 For example, Ireland has used a variety of financial incentives in its suc-
cessful campaign to attract FDI and develop its computer and electronic sector.
UNCTAD, WORLD INvESTMENT REPORT 1998: TRENDs AND DErERMINANTS 105
(1998).
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brought by investors under Chapter 11 against regulatory meas-
ures imposed by NAFTA states. Chapter 11 is arguably the best
tool available to consider the way in which to frame the delicate re-
lationship between a multilateral investment agreement and regu-
latory autonomy. In particular, such an analysis enables a norma-
tive assessment of the advantages or otherwise of using a Chapter
11 NAFTA model as a guide for a WTO investment agreement on
this question.
4.1. Overview
There are four essential components to Chapter 11 of NAFTA:
scope of application, investment liberalization, protection, and dis-
pute settlement. Of the discriminatory measures considered in
Section 3 of this Article, the NAFTA Chapter 11 model primarily
aims to discipline the use of pre- and post-admission restrictions
by a NAFTA state. In comparison, there are few provisions limit-
ing the use of investment incentives.
4.1.1. Scope ofApplication: Article 1101
The coverage of the substantive provisions of NAFTA is de-
lineated by Article 1101. This provides two separate planes of ap-
plication. First, all the Chapter 11 disciplines apply to measures of
a NAFTA state relating to "investors" of a NAFTA state and to
"investments" by investors of a NAFTA state. In addition, the par-
ticular disciplines in Article 1106 (Performance Requirements) and
1114 (Environmental Measures) apply to all investments (that is,
including domestic investments and investments from non-
NAFTA countries).
The key definition in appreciating the coverage of Chapter 11
of NAFTA is that of "investment" in Article 1139. The NAFTA
model adopts a very broad, asset-based definition of "investment"
extending to most forms of capital such as equity security, debt se-
curity, debt finance and real estate in a NAFTA country. Indeed,
the NAFTA approach goes beyond FDI to include portfolio in-
vestment by virtue of the fact that "equity security" is included in
limb (b) of the definition without any percentage limitation on
ownership. This is also bolstered by limb (e) of the definition,
which would go beyond direct ownership of equity security
(where the quantum of ownership is not sufficient to characterize
the investment as FDI) to include beneficial ownership of the un-
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derlying interest (through, for example, holding units in a listed
investment trust).72
But there are tendencies within the interpretation that counter
this broad approach. First, the Article 1139 definition sets out an
exhaustive list of interests that would qualify as an investment.
73
Even within this list, there are limiting factors within the definition
of certain interests. For example, loan finance is only covered un-
der item (d) of the definition if the loan is made to an enterprise
that is an affiliate of the investor or where the original maturity of
the loan is at least three years. Thus, this approach only covers in-
tra-firm debt flows or debt with a relatively long-term perspective.
In other words, the NAFTA approach explicitly excludes shorter-
term debt (whose volatility led to liquidity problems in the Asian
financial crisis) from attracting the benefit of the disciplines in
Chapter 11.74 A similar theme is evident in item (h) of the defini-
tion, which tries to isolate key characteristics of an investment not
necessarily related to an enterprise (whether through equity or
debt) or real estate. Item (h) of the definition of "investment" in
Article 1139 includes:
Interests arising from the commitment of capital or other
resources in the territory of a Party to economic activity in
such territory such as under contracts involving the pres-
ence of an investor's property in the territory of the Party,
including turnkey or construction contracts; or contracts
where remuneration depends substantially on the produc-
tion, revenues or profits of an enterprise. 75
This approach of trying to identify the characteristics of an in-
vestment (thereby delineating what forms of capital get the benefit
of Chapter 11) is also bolstered by the limited exclusions to the
72 NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1139. Limb (e) of the definition of "investment"
includes "an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or
profits of the enterprise" (emphasis added).
73 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1139 (stating what "investment" means). In
comparison, the MAI definition was much broader by adopting a non-exhaustive
list of interests that would qualify as an investment.
74 See infra Section 5.1. for an examination of the volatility of loan finance and
portfolio investment (when compared to FDI) in the Asian financial crisis of 1998
in the context of the MAI negotiations.
75 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1139(h).
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definition of "investment" in items (i) and (j) of Article 1139. These
are essentially claims to money arising from trade in goods or ser-
vices or related forms of financing (such as trade financing).
4.1.2. Investment Liberalization: Articles 1102 to 1104 and 1106
The first substantive discipline on national measures affecting
investors and investments of a NAFTA state are the liberalization
commitments in Chapter 11. Liberalization is effected primarily
through the application of non-discriminatory standards of treat-
ment. But the NAFTA model is a typically American conception of
non-discrimination as applied to investment restrictions. Like
most BITs involving the United States, investors are provided with
the better of national and most-favored nation treatment, which ex-
tend to both proposed investments (pre-admission) as well as es-
tablished investments in a NAFTA state (post-admission).76 The
extension of liberalization commitments to the pre-establishment
phase is a striking aspect of NAFTA and one, which separates it
from other international initiatives such as the Energy Charter
Treaty. 7 The top-down structure of NAFTA Chapter 11 means
that these substantive commitments cover all economic sectors and
national laws of a NAFTA state unless specifically exempted by the
submission of a negative-list of non-conforming measures. 78 In
contrast to this strict approach, the GATS adopts a hybrid struc-
ture, which involves elements of a bottom-up approach. WTO
members can either make horizontal commitments (across all ser-
vices sectors) or sector-specific commitments (which cover a par-
76 NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1102 (National Treatment), 1103 (Most-Favored-
Nation Treatment) & 1104 (Standard of Treatment). The obligation to accord na-
tional and most-favored-nation treatment to the proposed investments is indi-
cated by the inclusion of the words 'establishment' and 'acquisition' in Articles
1102 and 1103.
77 In the negotiations towards the Energy Charter Treaty from 1992 to 1994,
the negotiators could not agree on a binding regime for the pre-admission phase
and decided to postpone the negotiation of such a regime to a supplementary
stage. Instead, under the pre-admission phase, member states are subject to a soft
law, best efforts obligation under Articles 10(2) and 10(3). In comparison, inves-
tors are provided with full national and most-favored-nation treatment in the
post-admission phase under Article 10(7). See Thomas W. Walde, Introductory
Note, European Energy Charter Conference: Final Act, Energy Charter Treaty, Decisions
and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects
vol. 34, 34 I.L.M. 360, 361-62 (1995) (delineating the historical development of the
Energy Charter).
78 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1108 (Reservations and Exceptions), annexes I-
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ticular economic sector) to the national treatment obligation in Ar-
ticle XVII. This complicated structure provides WTO members
with significant discretion in determining in what manner to open
up their service sectors to foreign competition. However, analyses
to date of commitments scheduled under the GATS show only lim-
ited results in effecting liberalization in the services area.
79
The NAFTA liberalization commitments extend beyond impos-
ing non-discriminatory standards of treatment to encompass an
outright prohibition on the use of certain performance require-
ments by NAFTA member states.80 In this respect, the NAFTA
provisions go beyond the WTO approach in the TRIMS Agree-
ment. The NAFTA list of prohibited performance requirements in-
cludes, for example, technology transfer requirements that are not
explicitly covered by the TRIMS Agreement. 81 Article 1106 is also
the only part of Chapter 11 to deal with the use of investment in-
centives. Of itself, Article 1106 does not prevent a NAFTA party
from using incentives. It simply restricts their ability to link the
use of incentives to certain performance requirements.
82
4.1.3. Investment Protection: Articles 1110 and 1105
Like most investment agreements, NAFTA contains specific
rules on investment protection. Section 2.2 of this Article traced
the development of guarantees of investment protection in BITs to
the incidents of increased expropriation of investments in the wake
of decolonization efforts in the 1960s. The actual content of these
guarantees have been the subject of divergence of opinion between
developed and developing countries. 83 Nonetheless, investment
79 See, e.g., Bernard Hoekman, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 88-124 (Will Martin
& L. Alan Winters eds., 1996) (summarizing the main elements of GATS and pos-
sible implications of chosen scheduling approach); Pierre Sauv6, Assessing the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services-Half-Full or Half-Empty?, 29 (4) J. WORLD TRADE
125, 125-45 (1995) (assessing the structure, key provisions, and practical implica-
tions of the GATS).
80 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1106.
81 Id. art. 1106(f).
82 Id. art. 1106(3). The four performance requirements which cannot be
linked to the use of incentives are domestic content (art. 1106(3)(a)); domestic pur-
chase requirements or preferences (art. 1106(3)(b)); relationship between imports
and exports to foreign exchange inflows (art. 1106(3)(c)); and relationships of do-
mestic sales to exports or foreign earnings (art. 1106(3)(d)).
83 The content of international rules governing expropriation has historically
been characterized by competing positions between developed and developing
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protection provisions have been accepted by developing host states
for several decades in BITs, although those states have resisted
their incorporation into multilateral instruments.84
However, since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic reduction
in incidences of direct expropriation of foreign investment. 5 De-
spite this lessening of expropriatory behavior, the NAFTA incorpo-
rates extremely strong guarantees of investment protection in Arti-
cle 1110(1):
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropri-
ate an investment of an investor of another Party in its terri-
tory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or ex-
propriation of such an investment ("expropriation"),
except: for a public purpose; on a non-discriminatory basis;
in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1);
and on payment of compensation in accordance with para-
graphs 2 through 6.86.
Article 1110 clearly provides an obligation to compensate in the
event of direct expropriation of an investment in a NAFTA state.
But host states can always impose other regulatory measures that
may incrementally impact an investor but are not as immediately
serious as expropriation. The words "tantamount to nationaliza-
states. Developed states have generally insisted on specific requirements before
an expropriation would be regarded as lawful in international law. These have
typically been that the expropriation is in the public interest, not discriminatory
and accompanied by full compensation. Developed states have insisted that the
quantum of compensation, in turn, should reflect the so-called Hull formula of
"prompt adequate and effective compensation." In contrast, until relatively re-
cently, developing states have asserted that the question of expropriation is sub-
ject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the host country which determines how and to
what extent compensation is to be paid. This approach was often motivated by
ideology, especially in the former socialist states of Eastern Europe that held to the
Marxist philosophy that nationalization did not require any payment of compen-
sation. For a history of the development of the Hull formula and a comparison of
the approach of developed and developing states to the question of compensation
for expropriation, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 357-414 (1994).
84 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998)
(analyzing the factors behind the agreement of developing countries to agree to
strong provisions on investment protection in BITs).
85 See discussion supra Section 2.2. and text accompanying note 26.
86 NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1110(1).
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tion" in Article 1110 are clearly intended to deal with this type of
progressive or indirect expropriation. The critical problem that has
arisen with Article 1110 is that there is no clear definition of what
will constitute an indirect expropriation.87 There is no guidance
within NAFTA as to when legitimate governmental regulation,
which in some way adversely impacts a foreign investor, consti-
tutes indirect expropriation. This has led to a number of arbitral
cases under Chapter 11 brought by investors arguing that seem-
ingly normal regulatory measures are "tantamount to nationaliza-
tion."88 The flaw in the drafting of these clauses was also repli-
cated in the MAI negotiating draft and stringently opposed by
NGOs in their campaign against the MAI.
89
Article 1110 is also not the only provision in NAFTA, which
provides investors with guarantees of investment protection. Arti-
cle 1105 provides investors with a minimum standard of treatment
"in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security." 90 This approach sets a
minimum ceiling by which to treat foreign investors. In other
words, even if a NAFTA host state treats foreign and domestic in-
vestors equally under its domestic law, it may still breach Article
1105 if an arbitral tribunal finds that the actual level of treatment
violates international law standards of treatment. The problem is
that there is little consensus on what this standard constitutes, and
there is similar uncertainty as to the exact standard required by the
phrases "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and se-
curity." 91 The problem is compounded by the fact that little guid-
ance is given within the NAFTA text as to the interpretation of
such general phraseology. The uncertainty in the scope of the ap-
plication of Article 1105 has resulted in investors increasingly us-
ing this provision as an alternative means to Article 1110 in bring-
ing arbitral cases to challenge regulatory measures imposed by
NAFTA states.92
87 Id.
88 See infra Section 4.2. for an analysis of some of the main cases brought by
investors under NAFTA Chapter 11.
89 See infra Section 5.3. for an analysis of the NGO campaign against the MAI.
90 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1105.
9' See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 2, at 58-61 (discussing similar
provisions in BITs and acknowledging the lack of certainty in quantum of treat-
ment provided by this type of clause).
92 See also infra Section 4.2. (discussing case law stemming from NAFTA
Chapter 11).
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4.1.4. Dispute Settlement
The fourth limb of the Chapter 11 model constitutes the proce-
dures relating to the settlement of investment disputes. Under Sec-
tion B of Chapter 11, an investor of a NAFTA state may commence
arbitral proceeding for breach of any of the provisions in Section A
of Chapter 11.
There are strong normative justifications for the inclusion of an
investor-state dispute resolution procedure in an agreement of this
sort. Normally, disputes between a state and a private entity
(rather than foreign government) would be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the host country. But in many developing host states, the
legal system may not have the resources or judicial traditions to
deliver certainty in the resolution of disputes.93 In addition (even
for developed host states), once an investor has entered into the
host state through a bricks-and-mortar-type of FDI, they are effec-
tively a form of hostage to the host state that can extract rents
through discriminatory conduct. With this form of relatively im-
mobile investment, it is not normally a feasible option for investors
to quit the host state in response. Direct dispute resolution proce-
dures provide investors with a legitimate avenue by which to en-
force commitments made by member states in the substantive
component of the investment agreement.
This is an important point because there has been much criti-
cism by NGOs and others of these dispute resolution procedures
both in NAFTA and the draft MAI. However, the real concern
about the breadth of some of the cases being brought by investors
under NAFTA Chapter 11 should not be simply grounded in the
existence of dispute resolution procedures. Instead, a more justifi-
able critique would focus on the broad and often undefined scope
of the liberalization and protection commitments in the NAFTA
model.
93 The tenor of investor concern with using the courts in developing states is
evidenced by a recent statement from an investor in Cambodia:
The court system just doesn't work .... [We're seeing more business
disputes being resolved in antagonistic and adversarial ways than ever
.... Resolutions of disputes are lawless, it's law of the jungle .... [lnves-
tors end up having to pay off judges, get some police involved and flail
and push people to resolve even simple business disputes.
Phelim Kyne, Fear Grips Business in Cambodia, AGE (Melbourne, Austl.), July 22,
2000, at 18.
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4.1.5. Absences: Incentives and GATT Article XX-type Safety
Valve
Before examining the evolving jurisprudence from some of the
NAFTA cases, it is worthwhile to briefly highlight two absences in
the NAFTA model.
First, there are no direct substantive limitations on the use of
investment incentives despite their clearly discriminatory purpose
and distortive effect. There is, however, an interesting provision in
Article 1114 that limits the ability of the NAFTA parties to lower
their health, safety or environmental measures as an inducement
for a foreign investor. The basis for this article is the fear that using
this type of regulatory incentive to attract investors could lead to
competitive downward pressure (or a race to the bottom) on regu-
latory standards. Interestingly, there appears to be little empirical
justification for fears of a race to the bottom, at least on environ-
mental standards.94 Yet, Article 1114 is notable from a normative
perspective as integrating broader public values than simply eco-
nomic liberalization goals. In the MAI episode, the OECD only be-
latedly considered similar provisions after sustained attacks by
NGOs and growing public concern over the legitimacy of the
agreement. Further, Article 1114 is not an overly ambitious
mechanism for integrating broader values; it is an instrument of
negative integration (in the sense of specifying what must not be
done) rather than positive integration (which could, for example,
set what environmental standards states must maintain).
Second, unlike the trade liberalization commitments in the
GATT, 95 there is no Article XX-type 96 safety valve in Chapter 11,
94 See David Vogel, Environmental Regulation and Economic Integration, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPETING PERSPECTIVES
330-47 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001) (arguing that there is a lack
of empirical evidence indicating a race to the bottom on environmental stan-
dards).
95 Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 33,33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATTI].
96 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, part II, art. XX, available
at http://www.jurisint.org/pub/06/en/doc/05.htm. This article provides a
number of exceptions from GATT obligations to enable member states to adopt
measures designed to achieve certain non-trade goals. In part, Article XX pro-
vides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a man-
ner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
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which would provide a general exception to the prohibition
against discrimination. But as will be seen next, there have been
attempts in the evolving jurisprudence of the NAFTA cases to try
and implant the kind of reasoning employed in the Article XX
cases of the GATT/WTO dispute resolution procedures. Inserting
an Article XX-type exception-by arbitral fiat or otherwise-may
not be the best way in which to counter the artificial use of inves-
tors of the Chapter 11 dispute resolution procedures. GATT panels
themselves have struggled with the application of Article XX and
its constituent parts, which has led to a variety of inconsistent in-
terpretations. 97 These inconsistencies have in turn led to questions
about the underlying legitimacy of the GATT and the capacity of
GATr panels to manage complex tradeoffs between free trade and
broader public values. 98 From the perspective of a possible WTO
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.
97 See, e.g., Report of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, European Communi-
ties Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R
(Sept. 18, 2000) available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-viewerwindow.asp
?D:/DDFDOCUMENTS/T/WT/DS/135R; Report of the WTO Appellate Body
and Dispute Settlement Panel, United States -Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/12 (May 20, 1996), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org?GEN-viewerwindow.asp?D:/DDFDOCUMENTS/T
/WT/DS/58RO; Report of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, United States-
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R Gan. 29,
1996), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-viewerwindow.asp?D:
/DDFDOCUMENTS/T/WT/DS/58RO; Report of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Panel, United States -Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/R Uan. 29, 1996), available at http://docsonine.wto.org/GEN
viewerwindow.asp?D:/DOFDOCUMENTS/T/WT/DS/2R.W; Dispute Settle-
ment Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 1992,
vol. 33, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994); Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Re-
strictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M 1594 (1991); Thailand Re-
strictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7,1990, GATT
B.I.S.D. (37th supp.), at 200 (1991).
93 Literature on the Article XX cases is voluminous. For thoughtful analyses
of the difficulties in drawing the line between free trade goals and broader regula-
tory autonomy, see Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International
Trade Law and the Regulatory State: Ahat Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn
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investment agreement, this Article will consider an alternative ap-
proach. It will use the evolving NAFTA jurisprudence to illustrate
the uncertain scope and conflicting interpretations of the substan-
tive commitments in the NAFTA Chapter 11 model. In turn, the
MAI simply replicated and extended many of these substantive
commitments. It is submitted that WTO negotiators may be able to
best balance the fine line between elimination of discriminatory
measures whilst preserving core regulatory autonomy by carefully
defining and delineating the substantive commitments within a
WTO investment agreement (rather than relying on exceptions to
otherwise undefined liberalization commitments).
4.2. Some Problematic Chapter 11 NAFTA Case Law99
The focus of this Section of the Article is on the evolving and
inconsistent way in which arbitral tribunals have interpreted the
broad liberalization and protection commitments in Chapter 11.
For reasons of space, this Article will not consider all of the arbitral
cases under Chapter 11.100 Instead, the Author has chosen three
from the Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY
BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NoN-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 139
(Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000); Michael Trebilcock & Robert
Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets
with Competitive Politics, EUR. J. L. EcoN. 5 (1998).
99 There is no central repository of documents submitted in Chapter 11 cases.
For Chapter 11 cases involving Canada, the website of the Canadian Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (http://www.drait-maeci.gc.ca) main-
tains a comprehensive list of documents submitted in relation to such cases. For
Chapter 11 cases involving other NAFTA states, the best source of documents are
two websites maintained by attorneys who are active in this area:
http://www.appletonlaw.com and http://www.toddweiler.com. These sites,
however, are not complete, and some documents involved in NAFTA cases are
difficult to locate.
100 For analyses that mainly focus on NAFTA Chapter 11 cases and particu-
larly their impact on national environmental measures, see David A. Gantz, Poten-
tial Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA's
Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 651 (2001); J. Martin Wagner, International
Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
465 (1999). For a comparative overview of the NAFTA approach and other in-
vestment treaties on this question, see Thomas W. Wdide, International Disciplines
on National Environmental Regulation: With Particular Focus on Multilateral Invest-
ment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS 29, 64-70 (Int'l Bu-
reau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2001). See also Ari Afilalo, Consti-
tutionalization Through the Back Door: A European Perspective on NAFTA's Investment
Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (2001) ("Argu[ing] that Chapter 11 threatens
to establish a system of state liability for violations of key provisions of the gen-
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cases to illustrate trends towards inconsistent interpretation of Ar-
ticles 1102 (National Treatment), 1105 (Minimum Standard of
Treatment) and 1110 (Expropriation). Indeed, growing concern re-
garding the breadth of interpretation afforded to these provisions
recently led the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to issue an inter-
pretation to try and limit the operation of Chapter 11.101
4.2.1. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States
In this case, Metalclad Corporation ("Metalclad"'), a U.S. com-
pany, bought land in order to establish a waste disposal facility in
the Mexican Municipality of Guadalcazar ("the Municipality") lo-
cated in the Mexican State of San Luis Potosi ("State").102 In Janu-
ary 1993, Metalclad was granted a federal permit to construct a
waste landfill, and construction started soon thereafter. However,
the State government and the Municipality raised opposition based
on environmental grounds. 103 In October 1994, the Municipality
ordered the cessation of building activities due to the absence of a
municipal construction permit.104 Federal officials told Metalclad
to apply for a municipal construction permit because it would be
issued as a matter of course and would facilitate amicable relations
with the Municipality. Metalclad applied for a permit, continued
construction, and completed the landfill site in March 1995. But on
December 1995, the Municipality denied Metalclad's application
eral trade in goods rules of NAFTA/WTO law."); David Lopez, Dispute Resolution
Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 163 (1997) (ana-
lyzing the formal dispute resolution mechanisms under NAITA); Chris Tollefson,
Games without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA
Regime, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 141 (2002) (arguing that countries must recognize the
asymmetry between how NAFTA parties perceive and respond to threats to their
sovereignty in relation to transnational investors).
101 On July 31, 2001, the NAFTA states, through the auspices of the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission, agreed to clarify the operation of some of the Chapter 11
provisions, particularly Article 1105. See U.S., Canada, Mexico Agree to Clarify
NAFTA's Investor-State Provisions, 19 (31) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 21-23 (Aug. 3, 2001)
[hereinafter NAFTA Free Trade Commission Interpretation]. Components of the Free
Trade Commission Interpretation are examined further in Section 4.3 infra.
102 For a summary description of the facts in this dispute, see Abstract of
ICSID (Additional Facility): Metalclad Corp. v United Mexican States, vol. 40,40 I.L.M.
35, paras. 28-69 (2001) [hereinafter Metalclad], available at http://www.dfeitmaeci
.gc.ca/tna-mac/mun-metalclad-e.pdf.
103 Id. paras. 42-44.
104 Metalclad, supra note 102, para. 40.
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for a permit in a process that was closed to Metalclad.105 In Sep-
tember 1997, the Governor of the State issued an ecological decree
declaring the site of the landfill a "Natural Area" for the protection
of rare cactus. The State's decree further prevented the possibility
of Metalclad's use of the waste operation facility.
Metalclad argued that Mexico, through the acts of its State and
Municipal authorities, breached Articles 1105 (Minimum Standard
of Treatment) and 1110 (Expropriation). The arbitral tribunal
found in favor of Metalclad and awarded U.S. $16.7 million in
damages against Mexico in August 2000.106
First, the Tribunal found that Mexico breached its obligation to
accord Metalclad "fair and equitable" treatment under Article
1105. The primary basis for this finding was the lack of "transpar-
ency" in the application processes for obtaining approval for the
project at the various federal, state, and local levels. 07 The Tribu-
nal was also influenced by the fact that Metalclad's application for
a local permit was denied without any notice or opportunity to ap-
pear at the hearing. 08 Thus, the Tribunal in this case is interpret-
ing the standard of treatment required by Article 1105 by reference
to concepts of transparency and due process. The conclusion on
transparency is particularly grounded by reference to the general
transparency commitment in Article 102(1) of NAFTA1 09
The Tribunal also found that the actions of the Mexican au-
thorities breached the prohibition on expropriation in Article 1110.
In doing so, the Tribunal gave a very broad interpretation of the
coverage of protection under Article 1110 as including:
[N]ot only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of
property... but also covert or incidental interference with
the use of property which has the effect of depriving the
105 Metalclad was not notified of the Town Council meeting that considered
the permit application nor was it given an opportunity to participate in that meet-
ing. Metalclad's request for reconsideration of the denial of the permit was sub-
sequently rejected. Id. para. 54.
106 Id. para. 59.
107 "The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal
construction permit, as well as the absence of any established practice or proce-
dure as to the manner of handling applications for a municipal permit, amounts to
a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by NAFTA."
Id. para. 49.
108 Id. para. 49.
109 Id. para. 47.
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owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or rea-
sonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if
not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state.110
On the facts, the Tribunal found that since the federal govern-
ment approved the project, which was within its authority to do,
and then permitted the Municipality to hinder the operation of the
project, Mexico had taken a measure "tantamount to expropria-
tion" in breach of Article 1110. Interestingly, the Tribunal went on
to consider the effect of the ecological decree of the site as a "Natu-
ral Area." It basically concluded that this decree provided "further
ground for a finding of expropriation" given its effect of barring
the operation of the landfill."' The breadth of the protection for
indirect expropriation under Article 1110 can be gleaned from the
Tribunal's view that "the implementation of the Ecological Decree
would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropria-
tion.""112
4.2.2. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada
In this case, S.D. Myers, a U.S. company, operated a Canadian
entity to transport PCB hazardous waste from Canada to its treat-
ment plants in Ohio. S.D. Myers claimed that Canada's banning of
PCB exports from November 1995 to February 1997 breached Arti-
cles 1102 (National Treatment), 1105 (Minimum Standard of
Treatment), 1106 (Performance Requirements), and 1110 (Expro-
priation). In November 2000, the arbitral Tribunal in this case
found breaches of the first two claims but rejected the remainder of
them.
In examining the national treatment obligation in Article 1102,
the Tribunal held that it is necessary to take into account whether
the measure is on its face discriminatory as well as discriminatory
in effect.113 In other words, the Tribunal followed long-standing
GATT/WTO jurisprudence in finding that national treatment (al-
beit in the investment context) extended to both de jure and de
facto discrimination. The measure before the Tribunal was by no
110 Id. para. 50 (emphasis added).
"I Id. para. 51.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Arbitration: S.D. Myers, Inc.
v. Government of Canada, 40 I.L.M 1408,1437 (2001) [hereinafter S.D. Myers].
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means discriminatory on its face, as it was a blanket ban on all PCB
exports (whether by domestic participants or foreign investors) out
of Canada. The Tribunal, however, went on to indicate that the
quantum of de facto discrimination necessary for grounds of a
breach of the national treatment norm is whether the policy creates
"a disproportionate benefit for nationals over non-nationals." 114
This type of reasoning does not have an equivalent in the jurispru-
dence that has developed around the Article III national treatment
norm of the GATT.115 Unfortunately, the Tribunal did not apply
this approach to the facts. Instead, there is a troubling emphasis on
the role of protectionist intent in grounding a breach of Article
1102.
Although the Tribunal states that protectionist intent is not
alone sufficient to breach Article 1102,116 the structure of the judg-
ment tends to contradict this statement. There is a lengthy analysis
early in the judgment where the Tribunal reviews large amounts of
evidence to find that the Canadian government passed the export
ban as an attempt to protect domestic Canadian producers rather
than basing it on environmental grounds. 117 In contrast, there is lit-
tle substantive analysis of the discriminatory impact of the export
ban. At most, the Tribunal characterized the desire to retain the
ability to process PCB waste in Canada as a legitimate goal but in-
dicated that there were other ways in which Canada could have
favored domestic PCB facilities without breaching NAFTA rules."
8
This textual emphasis on intent in the judgment is problematic.
In passing regulatory measures, governments often attempt to
broaden public support for their policies by providing statements
designed to appeal to vocal interest groups in the community. But
these statements, by themselves, should not be enough to substan-
114 Id.
115 In fact, this point was raised in a later case initiated by Pope & Talbot, Inc.
against the Government of Canada. The Tribunal in that case rejected the applica-
tion of the "disproportionate benefit" test to Article 1102. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Canada, Trib. Arb. paras. 43-72 (Apr. 10, 2001), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc
.ca/tna-nac/award-merits-e.pdf.
116 S.D. Myers, supra note 113, at 1437.
117 Id. at 1424-48. The Tribunal also emphasizes the somewhat unfortunate
words of the Canadian Minister of the Environment that it was Canada's policy
that PCB waste should be disposed of "in Canada by Canadians." See id. at 1425.
118 The two examples given are procurement preferences by Canadian gov-
ernmental departments and the grant of subsidies to the Canadian industry. Id. at
1437.
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tiate an allegation of discrimination. Further, this kind of govern-
mental intent analysis is problematic from a legitimacy perspec-
tive, whereby an arbitral Tribunal is seen as second-guessing the
deliberations of a representative government. These concerns have
long been expressed in prominent GATT/WTO cases analyzing
the national treatment norm in Article ]I.119 It is suprising that the
arbitrator in this case failed to heed these long-standing concerns.
In its analysis of Article 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treat-
ment), the Tribunal's approach seems'somewhat contradictory to
the strong emphasis on intent under Article 1102.120 The Tribunal
goes on to consider that a breach of Article 1105 occurs only if an
investor has been "treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner
that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the
international perspective." 12 That treatment has to be "made in
119 See WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions Report of the Panel, Japan Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R; WT/DS10/R; WT/DS11/R (uly 11, 1996), para.
6.16, reprinted in 1 BERNAN'S ANN. REP. 69,169-70 (1998)
The Panel also noted that very often there is a multiplicity of aims that
are sought through enactment of legislation and it would be a difficult
exercise to determine which aim or aims should be determinative ...
Moreover, access to the complete legislative history ... could be difficult
or even impossible for a complaining party to obtain. Even if the com-
plete legislative history is available, it would be difficult to assess which
kinds of legislative history (statements in legislation, in official legislative
reports, by individual legislators, or in hearings by interested parties)
should be primarily determinative of the aims of the legislation.
Id. See also WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions Report of the Appellate Body, Ja-
pan Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS1O/AB/R;
WT/DS11/AB/R (October 4, 1996), 196, reprinted in 1 BERNAN's ANN. REP. 183
(1998) (emphasizing that "[t]he proper interpretation of the Article is, first of all, a
textual interpretation"). But cf. WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions Report of the
Appellate Body, Chile Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS/97/AB/R (Dec. 13,
1999), reprinted in 14 BERNAN's ANN. REP. 49 (1998) (stressing the permissibility of
taking into account the statutory purposes or objectives expressed in the design,
architecture, and structure of the regulatory measure for the purpose of examin-
ing the issue "so as to afford protection" in the context of Article m.1 of GAT1).
120 S.D. Myers, supra note 113, at 1438. When interpreting and applying the
"minimum standard," a Chapter 11 tribunal does not have an open-ended man-
date to second-guess government decision-making. Governments have to make
many potentially controversial choices. In doing so, they may appear to have
made mistakes, to have misjudged the facts, proceeded on the basis of a mis-
guided economic or sociological theory, placed too much emphasis on some social
values over others and adopted solutions that are ultimately ineffective or coun-
terproductive. The ordinary remedy, if there were one, for errors by modem gov-
ernments is through internal political and legal processes, including elections.
121 Id.
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light of the high measure of deference that international law gener-
ally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters
within their own borders." 1' 2 But unlike Metalclad, with its empha-
sis on transparency and due process, little attention is given to ex-
actly what this level of treatment should be to ground a breach of
Article 1105. Instead, the Tribunal simply finds that "on the facts
of this particular case the breach of Article 1102 essentially estab-
lishes a breach of Article 1105 as well."1 3 This seemingly simplistic
approach of linking a breach of Article 1102 to a breach of Article
1105 underscores the uncertainty inherent in its application.
The Tribunal found no breach of Article 1110 on expropriation.
Unlike Metalclad, the Tribunal appeared uncomfortable with ex-
tending protection from expropriation to the impact of normal
regulatory measures. The Tribunal found that the term "expro-
priation" carries with it the connotation of a "taking" of personal
property by a governmental authority with a view towards trans-
ferring ownership to another person. 24 In fact, the Tribunal went
so far as to conclude that regulatory conduct by public authorities
is unlikely to be the subject of a legitimate complaint under Article
1110.125 The Tribunal found that the PCB ban did not amount to an
"expropriation" because it was temporary and the evidence did
not support a transfer of property or directly benefit others.
126
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1440.
125 Id. The greater deference to regulatory autonomy is clearly evident in the
following statement:
Expropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights, regu-
lations, and lesser interference. The distinction between expropriation
and regulation screens out most potential cases of complaints concerning
economic intervention by a state and reduces the risk that governments
will be subject to claims as they go about their business of managing
public affairs. An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of
the ability of an owner to make use of its economic rights although it
may be that, in some context and circumstances, it would be appropriate
to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were
partial or temporary.
Id.
126 Id.
[23:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss4/3
2002] WTO GENERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT
Finally, a notable aspect of this arbitral decision is the fact that
a separate opinion was prepared by one of the arbitrators12 7
Within this lengthy opinion, the arbitrator addresses the tension
between regulatory autonomy and the liberalization and protection
provisions of NAFTA. In particular, the arbitrator argues that the
analysis employed to determine whether there has been a breach of
Article 1102 (National Treatment) may be similar to that used in an
Article XX case under GATT/WTO auspices. 28 The intention of
the arbitrator on this point is laudable: to use the reference to "in
like circumstances" in Article 1102 as a meaningful way for re-
spondent governments to justify legitimate regulatory measures
with limited effects on free trade and investment goals.129 But the
problem with this approach is that it grafts an exception model
(such as Article XX in the GATT) to Chapter 11 as a means of re-
solving this question. Within GATT/WTO jurisprudence, the Arti-
cle XX exception has been interpreted in a variety of inconsistent
ways. In particular, the analysis of whether a given measure is the
least trade-restrictive measure available to achieve a non-free trade
goal (such as the protection of public health) has led to the curious,
127 The separate opinion was prepared by Dr. Bryan Schwartz and concurs
with most of the findings in the arbitral award but provides some additional rea-
soning. Id. at 1447-89.
128 The arbitrator states:
Article 1102 (National Treatment) of NAFTA is not made subject to an
equivalent of Article XX (General Exceptions) of GATT. Read in its
proper context, however, the phrase 'like circumstances' in Article 1102
in many cases does require the same kind of analysis as is required in Ar-
ticle XX cases under the GATT. The determination of whether there is a
denial of national treatment to investors or investments 'in like circum-
stances' under Article 1102 of NAFTA may require an examination of
whether a government treated non-nationals differently in order to
achieve a legitimate policy objective that could not be reasonably accom-
plished by other means that are less restrictive to open trade.
Id. at 1454.
129 In comparison, the other members of the arbitral tribunal take a much
more restricted view of the operation of the words "in like circumstances" in Arti-
cle 1102. Initially, the members find that the interpretation of this phrase must
take into account general principles that emerge from the legal context of the
NAFTA, including its environmental provisions. They go on to say that this as-
sessment "must also take into account circumstances that would justify govern-
mental regulations that treat them differently in order to protect the public inter-
est." However, these broad interpretative principles are not applied to the facts of
the case. Instead, the Panel members focus largely on whether the foreign inves-
tor complaining of discrimination is in the same economic or business sector as
that of the domestic participant in the market. Id. at 1437.
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and potentially dangerous situation of some GATT Panels ignoring
the realities of the regulatory decision-making process.
130
4.2.3. Methanex v. United States
In this on-going action, Methanex, a Canadian company, with
some facilities located in the United States, has brought a Chapter
11 action against an Executive Order in which the State of Califor-
nia provided for the removal of a gasoline additive known as
MTBE by no later than December 31, 2002.131 The basis for the de-
cision to ban MTBE was a study undertaken by the University of
California, which concluded that, "there [were] significant risks
and costs associated with water contamination due to the use of
MTBE." 132 Methanex claims to be one of the world's largest pro-
ducers and marketers of methanol, a principal ingredient of
MTBE. 133
Methanex originally brought an action under Chapter 11 on the
basis that the California measure breached Articles 1105 (Minimum
Standard of Treatment) and 1110 (Expropriation) and claimed
130 In particular, see Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GAT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991) (sum-
marizing GAT's analysis of Thailand's cigarette tax structure and importation
policies). In this case, Thailand attempted to defend import restrictions and dis-
criminatory tax treatment imposed against American cigarettes as "necessary" for
public health reasons under Article XX(b). Thailand had adopted a variety of
measures to achieve its public health objectives including advertising bans, health
warnings on cigarette packets, and discriminatory measures. Thailand justified
the discriminatory measures on the basis of evidence put forward by the World
Health Organization that the U.S. cigarette industry had the resources to avoid
non-inconsistent measures such as advertising bans. The Panel simply ignored
this evidence in finding that least-restrictive alternatives such as advertising bans
were adequate to meet Thailand's public health objectives.
131 For a summary description of the facts in the case, compare Claimant
Methanex Corporation's Draft Amended Claim, Methanex Corp. v. United States,
(Feb. 12, 2001), at 4-33, [hereinafter Methanex Amended Claim] (alleging that the ban
is a result of "the action of the U.S. ethanol industry and its political allies to ex-
pand ethanol's protected status, and in particular their attempts to create a public
perception that MTBE and methanol are dangerous foreign products whose use
should be restricted"), available at http://www.toddweiler.com (law modified
Sept. 26, 2002) with Statement of Defense of Respondent United States, Methanex
Corp. v. The United States of America, (Aug. 10, 2000), at 6-26 [hereinafter U.S.
Defense] (stating that "the California legislature's authorization of funding for
anniversary study of the public health and environmental effects of MTBE" is a
violation of NAFTA), available at http://www.toddweiler.com.
132 U.S. Defense, supra note 131, at 18-22.
133 See Methanex Amended Claim, supra note 131, at 4-5 ("Methanex's sales rep-
resented approximately 24% of the world market in methanol.").
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damages of U.S. $970 million. The United States vigorously op-
posed this claim with a particular emphasis on its impact on the
regulatory autonomy of the NAFTA states.134 On February 12,
2001, Methanex lodged an amended claim that builds on some of
the worrying trends discerned in earlier NAFTA cases, especially
S.D. Myers. In August 2002, an arbitral tribunal ruled on the U.S.
challenge to Methanex's claim on jurisdictional grounds.135 The
Tribunal found that Methanex's amended claim as a whole did not
meet the jurisdictional requirements of Article 1101 but it ruled
that certain Methanex claims might fall within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. 36 It then ordered Methanex to submit a fresh plead-
ing in the case supported by sufficient evidentiary materials. 37
As of the date of the writing of this Article, the revised
Methanex claim had not been submitted. Yet, the original points
put forward in the amended claim are clearly instructive in the
way that they have been influenced by trends from previous deci-
sions of NAFTA arbitral tribunals. First, the amended claim argues
that the California measure breaches Article 1102 (National Treat-
ment). In raising its argument, the amended claim relies heavily
on the analysis of the national treatment norm in S.D. Myers.138 As
in S.D. Myers, Methanex attempts to ground its case for breach of
Article 1102 by adducing evidence of a protectionist intent or pr-
134 The tenor of the U.S. defense is evident in the following extract:
Methanex's claim does not remotely resemble the type of grievance for
which the States Parties to the NAFTA created the investor-state dispute
resolution mechanism of Chapter 11. Methanex's case is founded on the
proposition that, whenever a State takes action to protect the public
health or environment, the State is responsible for damages to every
business enterprise claiming a resultant setback in its fortunes ... Plainly
put, this proposition is absurd. If accepted by the Tribunal, no NAFTA
Party could carry out its most fundamental governmental functions
unless it were prepared to pay for each and every economic impact occa-
sioned by doing so. The NAFTA Parties never intended the NAFTA to
bring about such a radical change in the way that they function, and
Methanex cannot show otherwise.
U.S. Defense, supra note 131, at 2.
135 See Methanex Corporation v. United States, 1st Partial Award, Aug. 7,
2002 (explicating the arbitral tribunal's findings), available at http://www.state
.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf.
136 Id. at 83-84.
137 Id. at 84.
133 Methanex Amended Claim, supra note 131, at 45-47 (quoting from S.D. Myers
the factors for determining whether measure is contrary to natural treatment
norm).
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pose within the California measures. The protectionist purpose is
framed as a desire to prefer California's ethanol industry as a sub-
stitute product for MTBE. 139 Yet, the evidence adduced is not
nearly as strong as that provided for in S.D. Myers. For example,
this part of the claim relies on relatively innocuous statements
within the Executive Order suggesting further analysis on fostering
a domestic ethanol industry and labeling requirements at the
pump that the gasoline does not contain MTBE.140 In contrast,
here, there is no attempt to prove the discriminatory impact of the
California measure.
Methanex's revised argument on the basis of Article 1105
(Minimum Standard of Treatment) is of even greater concern.
Methanex attempts to define the scope of operation of Article 1105,
but does so in an extremely broad manner. Methanex makes the
preliminary point that the reference to "international law" in Arti-
cle 1105 includes both customary and treaty-based forms of inter-
national law.141 The reference to treaty-based forms of interna-
tional law is then used to try to bring in certain GATT/WTO
disciplines within the coverage of Article 1105. This represents a
logical link to the approach taken in S.D. Myers particularly in the
separate opinion on Article 1102. On the whole, Methanex argues
that Article 1105 covers a minimum of four separate principles. 1
42
On the first purported principle, Methanex attempts to argue
that the decision to ban MTBE was unfair because of alleged cam-
paign contributions provided to the California governor by a lead-
ing U.S.-based ethanol producer.143 In other words, Methanex is
using the largely undefined principles inherent in Article 1105 to
impugn the process of domestic rule-making, rather than its effects
on a foreign investor. The third purported principle follows the
curious (and seemingly simplistic) S.D. Myers approach of finding
a breach of Article 1102 (National Treatment) as sufficient in itself
as grounds for breach of Article 1105. The fourth purported prin-
139 Id. at 47.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 48.
142 These are: (i) that a decision maker purportedly acting independently and
in the public interest must not be biased by pecuniary considerations; (ii) that
state officials must act reasonably and in good faith; (iii) that discriminatory
measures are not allowed; and (iv) that a regulatory measure taken by a state
must not be a disguised form of protection but instead must be the least trade-
restrictive of the reasonably alternative measures. Id. at 49-58.
143 Id. at 49-51.
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ciple also runs along the lines of S.D. Myers, arguing that Article
1105 includes treaty-based forms of international law. 44 Methanex
uses this preliminary point to structure an argument based on the
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. The es-
sence of these arguments is that the use of a "least restrictive
means" analysis to suggest that the California ban on MBTE vio-
lated these agreements because there were less restrictive means of
solving the problem of contamination of drinking water, such as
fixing leaking storage tanks.145 Thus, Methanex is using the open-
ing made in S.D. Myers to argue that the approach of specific ex-
ceptions to the free trade goals inherent within the GATT/WTO
framework applies to the Chapter 11 NAFTA model. Methanex
then also, somewhat cynically, uses that exception approach to ar-
gue that the California measures do not satisfy the conditions nec-
essary in which to justify an exception to the NAFTA commit-
ments.
Finally, Methanex's claim that the California measure consti-
tutes an expropriation under Article 1110 also seems to be artifi-
cially stretched. The basis of the expropriation is a claim for loss of
business or profits rather than an outright "taking" of an invest-
ment.146 Aside from the debatable proposition that these are inter-
ests that can be expropriated under Article 1110, there is also the
144 The influence of the separate opinion in S.D. Myers is apparent throughout
Methanex's amended claim. For example:
As Dr. Bryan Schwartz stated in his S.D. Myers separate opinion: "The in-
terpretation and application of Article 1105 must, I tend to think, also
take into account the letter or spirit of widely, though not universally,
accepted international agreements like those in the WTO system and
those typical of BITs."
Id. at 58.
145 Id.
The principle of international law most applicable in this case is the
widely-accepted WTO/GATr rule that regulatory measures are only ac-
ceptable if they meet certain conditions. Such measures are legal if: (1)
they are intended to achieve a legitimate objective, (2) they are the least
trade-restrictive alternative that can achieve the legitimate objective, and
(3) they do not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.
These requirements are found in at least two multilateral treaties (1) the
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ... and (2) the WTO
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ....
146 Id. at 69-70.
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problem that Methanex is claiming an expropriation even though
the ban on MTBE will only take effect in 2003.
4.3. A Limited Retreat: The NAFTA Free Trade Commission
Interpretation
The submissions put forward in Methanex represent a very ag-
gressive and broad interpretation of the Chapter 11 commitments.
But they are partly based on broad and sometimes conflicting in-
terpretations by past NAFTA tribunals. Concern as to the breadth
of these approaches has led the NAFTA states to actively consider
ways in which to limit the scope of the protections offered by
Chapter 11. Canada has long been an advocate for clarifications to
Chapter 11 but, until Methanex, the United States had not been as
supportive of such an approach. 147 In fact, since the end of the
Clinton administration, there had been an "inter-agency" deadlock
on the question of investment protections in future trade deals.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Authority, Interior Department,
and Justice Department have all favored scaling back the invest-
ment protections, but have faced opposition by the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative and the Departments of Commerce and the Treasury.148
On July 31, 2001, the NAFTA states agreed, through the aus-
pices of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission ("FTC"), to clarify the
operation of some of the Chapter 11 provisions. 49 Of most interest
for the purposes of this discussion is the interpretation relating to
Article 1105. First, the interpretation issued by the FTC limits the
operation of Article 1105 to require member states only to provide
"the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
of aliens." 50 Unfortunately, the FTC interpretation goes no further
to provide guidance on exactly what this standard constitutes. But
the obvious intent is to deal with the tendency in some of the
147 Compare Zoellick Cool to Restrictions on Investor State Disputes, 19 (16) INSIDE
U.S. TRADE 5, 6 (Apr. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Zoellick] (discussing the resistance of
the U.S. Trade Representative to the Canadian push for limits on the Chapter 11
model), with U.S. Cites NAFTA Party Agreement to Limit Investor-State Disputes, 19
(20) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 11, 12 (May 18, 2001) (noting U.S. concerns about the
breadth of the Methanex claims under Chapter 11).
148 Zoellick, supra note 147, at 12.
149 A copy of the interpretation can be obtained from the web site of the Ca-
nadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca. See NAFTA Free Trade Commission Interpretation,
supra note 101 (providing a brief analysis of the interpretation).
150 Id. at 21.
[23:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss4/3
2002] WTO GENERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT 755
Chapter 11 cases (especially in S.D. Myers) to introduce principles
from treaty-based forms of international law, particularly from the
GATT/WTO agreements. The FTC interpretation also attempts to
deal with the S.D. Myers approach to Article 1105 by finding that
"a determination that there has been a breach of another provision
of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not
establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1)." 151 Can-
ada also sought restrictions on the ways in which a Chapter 11
panel could approach the question of expropriation under Article
1110,152 however the interpretation is silent on this point, and it is
unclear whether the United States and Mexico favor this ap-
proach. -53 There is also no guidance on what will potentially be the
most difficult issue for future Chapter 11 panels: developing a test
to apply the national treatment norm in the investment context
without unduly impinging on host state regulatory freedoms.
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story. In January 2002,
Methanex challenged the ability of the parties to limit the operation
of Chapter 11 in this manner. 5 4 To support its claims, Methanex
submitted an affidavit from a former Mexican negotiator stating
that the negotiating history of Chapter 11 contradicts the interpre-
tation adopted by the FTC. 5 5 In any event, Methanex's case has
recently suffered a new blow with a proposal before the U.S. Sen-
ate for a national ban on the use of MTBE as an oxygenate in gaso-
line. 5 6 However, the ongoing uncertainty as to the breadth of the
Chapter 11 provisions has forestalled finalizing the investment
provisions in future initiatives, particularly proposed free trade
agreements with Singapore and Chile as well as the regional Free
Trade Area of the Americas initiative.
5 7
151 Id. at 22.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Methanex Questions New Limits on NAFTA Investor Protections, 20 (1) INSIDE
U.S. TRADE 1, 22-25 Gan. 4,2002).
155 Id. at 23-25.
156 See David E. Rosenbaum, With Alaska Exploration Rejected, Senate Looks to
Ethanol, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2002, at A16 (discussing the politics of ethanol).
157 See Administration Mulls Government Veto Option for Investor Disputes, 20
(11) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 22-23 (Mar. 15, 2002); Business, Environmentalists Clash
over TPA Investor Protections, 19 (42) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 9, 10 (Oct. 19, 2001); Group
Faces Decision on Investor Protections for Chile FTA, 19 (47) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 18-
20 (Nov. 23, 2001); House Democrats Seek New Limits to Investor-State Disputes, 19
(40), INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 22-23 (Oct. 5, 2001); Investment Remains a Hole in U.S.-
Singapore FTA Negotiations, 19 (35) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 5, 6 (Aug. 31, 2001); U.S. In-
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The next Section of the Article will consider the failed negotia-
tions within the OECD towards the MAI. Although most (but not
all) of the NAFTA case law post-dates the MAI negotiations, the
MAI provisions themselves largely replicated the NAFTA Chapter
11 model. It was only towards the end of the failed negotiations
that the negotiators recognized some of the problems inherent in
this model and made a belated attempt to rectify them.
5. THE MAI EPISODE: A CAUTIONARY TALE
5.1. Overview
In 1991, the OECD commenced work on the idea of a multilat-
eral agreement on investment.158 The decision to study the possi-
bility of such an agreement was driven by three factors examined
earlier in Section 2 of this Article: the rapid growth in investment
flows by the early 1990s, the trend towards unilateral liberalization
of national restrictions on foreign investment in both developed
and developing states, and the patchwork of investment instru-
ments at the international level. 5 9
The results of the technical analysis were presented as a report
to the OECD Council of Ministers in May 1995.160 Based on this
report, the OECD Council agreed to commence negotiations to-
wards MAI with the mandate that the agreement was to:
provide for a broad multilateral agreement for international
investment with high standards for the liberalization of in-
vestment regimes and investment protection with effective
dispute settlement procedures; [and] be a free-standing in-
dustry Pushes NAFTA Investment Model in Future Agreements, 19 (17) INSIDE U.S.
TRADE 1, 22 (Apr. 27, 2001); Zoellick Warns Against Changes to Investor-State Provi-
sion, 19 (43) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 19, 20 (Oct. 26, 2001).
158 OECD, A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: REPORT BY THE
COMMITrEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
(CIME) AND THE COMMrITEE ON CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND INVISIBLE TRANSACTIONS
(CMIT), 1995 DAFFE/CMIT/CIME(95)13/FINAL, Annex [hereinafter
CIME/CMIT REPORT]. On February 19, 2002, the OECD publicly released a large
quantity of documents relating to the MAI negotiations (including the last version
of the draft negotiating text on its website), available at http://www.oecd.org
/daf/mai.
159 See generally CIME/CMIT REPORT, supra note 158, § 1 (discussing each of
these factors in The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment).
160 Id.
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ternational treaty open to all OECD Members and the
European Communities and to accession by non-OECD
Member countries, which will be consulted as negotiations
progress.'61
The first part of the mandate highlights the relatively limited
scope of the MAI exercise. Its primary aim was to build upon ex-
isting OECD instruments to set "high standards" on established
norms of investment liberalization and protection backed up by an
effective process of dispute settlement.162 Thus, the conception of
the MAI was based along the lines of the NAFTA Chapter 11
model of an investment agreement. The United States was also
strongly in favor of having the OECD as the forum for the MAI ne-
gotiations. 163 The basis for the U.S. preference for the OECD ap-
pears to be linked to the relatively modest results of the Uruguay
Round TRIMS Agreement which was often attributed to the recal-
citrance of developing states.164 The MAI was intended to avoid
this problem by negotiating strong, comprehensive rules amongst
the supposedly like-minded developed countries of the OECD.16
5
The view of the MAI at its inception in 1995 as an uncontrover-
sial, somewhat technical exercise of building upon existing norms
161 Id. § 3 [Mandate].
162 See id. § 2 (discussing the aims of the negotiations in Features of a Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment).
163 The role of the United States in spearheading negotiations within the
OECD is examined in Elizabeth Smythe, Your Place or Mine? States, International
Organizations and the Negotiation of Investment Rules, 7 (3) TRANSNAT'L CORP. 85, 101
(1998). The author bases her various assertions, in part, on interviews conducted
with MAI negotiators.
164 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 46, at 358.
165 During the negotiations towards the MAI from 1995 to 1998, there were 29
member states of the OECD. These were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tur-
key, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The OECD also
identified certain countries as likely candidates for accession and invited them to
sit in as observers at the negotiations in 1997 and 1998. These were initially Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, China, and the Slovak Republic. The three Bal-
tic countries-Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-were also later invited to join as
observers. See OECD, MULrrLATERAL AGREEMENT ON INvEsTMENT: REPORT BY THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP, Apr. 20, 1998, DAFFE/MAI(98)9/FINAL,
at 3 (listing the non-Member countries), available at http://www.oecd.org
/daf/mai.
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is also reflected in the time assigned for the conclusion of negotia-
tions. The report set an objective of two years for the conclusion of
negotiations, in time for the meeting of the OECD Council of Min-
isters in 1997.166 This two-year time frame for the conclusion of ne-
gotiations proved overly ambitious. 67 Two problem areas soon
arose. The first was internal as the political commitment of the
OECD member states to the liberalization commitments within the
MAI began to erode. Ongoing disputes between the United States,
Canada and the European Union ("EU") member states began to
overshadow the negotiations. 68 The MAI negotiators found it im-
possible to resolve three particular issues: the extra-territorial im-
pact of the U.S. Helms-Burton Act;169 the desire of France and Can-
166 CIME/CMIT REPORT, supra note 158, § 3 [Mandate].
167 Aside from the delays, which developed within the MAI negotiations, his-
tory has shown that negotiations towards multilateral investment instruments
proceed slowly, if at all. Within the WTO, negotiations towards the TRIMS
Agreement (which deals with performance requirements) were only concluded
after what has been described as "five years of tough negotiations." JOHN
CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND 309 (1995).
168 For further analysis of these so-called "deal breakers," see Peter T. Much-
linski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Lessons for the
Regulation of International Business, in FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTrvES OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 114, 129-31 (Ian Fletcher et al. eds., 2001).
169 In the middle of the MAI negotiations in March 1996, the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton Act) entered into law in the United
States. Title III of the Act allows U.S. citizens and corporations whose property
was expropriated by the Cuban government any time after January 1,1959 to sue
for damages against anyone who "traffics" in their former property after Novem-
ber 1, 1996. Title IV prohibits entry into the United States by persons who "traf-
fic" in confiscated property after March 12, 1996. This Act led to a fierce policy
conflict between the United States, EU, and Canada in the middle of the MAI ne-
gotiations. The underlying problem was that the Helms-Burton Act potentially
operated both extraterritorially and in a discriminatory manner against foreign
investors from non-U.S. states operating in Cuba. After the filing of a complaint
by the EU against the United States over the Helms-Burton Act in the WTO, an
understanding was eventually reached on this issue between the United States
and EU in May 1998 (but with significant restrictions on its scope which also en-
visaged amendments to the MAI negotiating text). But by that time, the
Lalumire Commission had already begun its investigation into the MAI leading
to France's withdrawal from negotiations in October 1998. It is notable that the
conflict over the Helms-Burton Act overshadowed the MAI episode from early in
the negotiations (in 1996) right up until 1998. See generally the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, 1996 U.S. Public Law 104-14, Mar. 12, 1996, vol. 35, 35
I.L.M. 357 (1996); EDWARD M. GRAHAM, FIGHTING THE WRONG ENEMY: ANTIGLOBAL
AcrIVIST AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 28 (2000); European Union-United
States, Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment
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ada (opposed by the United States) to include a general exemption
for culture in the MAI;170 and the EU proposal for an exemption for
regional economic organizations. 171 The second problem was the
onset of an aggressive campaign by non-governmental organiza-
tions ("NGOs") opposing the MAI in early 1997. A striking feature
of the structure of this campaign was the use of the Internet to co-
ordinate and link up a vast array of NGOs opposed to the MAI. At
the height of the NGO campaign, there were an estimated fifty
websites devoted to the MAI, together with 200 newsgroup post-
ings.172 Aside from general concerns about economic globalization,
the NGOs also opposed the MAI because of a substantive critique
of the similarities between the MAI provisions and the NAFTA
Chapter 11 model.
These difficulties caused the negotiations to outrun the original
two-year completion date. At the OECD Ministerial Council meet-
ing in May 1997, the Ministers agreed to extend the completion
date of negotiations to the May 1998 Ministerial meeting. But by
1998, the political climate, which had led the OECD to commence
MAT negotiations had dramatically changed. By that year, the
world witnessed in Southeast Asia "the strongest financial panic
Protection (May 19, 1998), at http://www.europa.eu/int/news/summit
/Summit9805/invest.htm.
170 The proposed exception would preserve the right of a Contracting Party
from taking any measure to regulate investment of foreign companies and the
conditions of activity of these companies, in the framework of policies designed to
preserve and promote cultural and linguistic diversity. This proposal was
strongly opposed by U.S. entertainment and media interests (the second largest
U.S. export industry). See OECD, THE MAI NEGOTiATING TEXT, Final Version, Apr.
24, 1998, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, at 128 [hereinafter MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT]
(setting out a proposed exception clause for cultural industries). See also William
Dymond, The MAI. A Sad and Melancholy Tale, in CANADA AMONG NATIONS 35
(Carleton University 1999) (discussing American opposition).
171 This proposal exempted defined regional economic organizations from
the most-favored-nation obligation under the MAI. This clause was strongly op-
posed by the United States, which argued that exemptions from the most-favored
nation (MFN) standard should only be permitted as listed country-specific excep-
tions. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 170, at 118-19; UNCTAD, LESSONS FROM
THE MAI14-15 (1999).
172 Stephen Kobrin, The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations, 112 FOREIGN POL'Y
97, 97 (1998). See also Madelaine Drohan, How the Net Killed the MAI, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 29, 1998, at 14; Guy de Jonquires, Network Guerillas, FIN.
TIMEs, Apr. 30,1998, at 12.
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since the Great Depression."173 The currency crisis affecting the
Thai baht in July 1997 led to a dramatic drop in loan finance and
portfolio investment into Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and to some
extent the Philippines over the course of 1998.174 Comparatively,
FDI flows proved to be relatively stable.175 In September 1998, Ma-
laysia imposed controls on some capital outflows in response to
the crisis.176 Two weeks prior to the Malaysia announcement, Rus-
sia had not only imposed controls on capital outflows but had also
defaulted on its loan obligations by announcing a 90-day morato-
rium.177
Against these dramatic changes in the global economy, the
prospects for the MAI as a treaty which aimed to liberalize all
forms of capital flow looked less certain.178 The new and less fa-
vorable atmosphere was reflected in the April 1998 OECD Ministe-
rial meeting. Contrary to past practice, the MAI became the single
focus for discussion in the meeting.179 Ministers reaffirmed "the
importance they attach to achieving a comprehensive framework
for investment" but went on to announce "a period of assessment
and further consultation between the negotiating parties and with
interested parts of their societies" in preparation for the next meet-
ing of the negotiators in October 1998.180
173 HELMUT REISEN, AFTER THE GREAT ASIAN SLUMP: TOWARDS A COHERENT
APPROACH TO GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS 5 (OECD Development Centre, Policy Brief
No. 16, 1999).
174 Id. at 9.
175 See generally WTO, ANNUAL REPORT 1999 8, 28-30 (1999); FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT, supra note 31, at 161-62; WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000, supra note
17, at 17-23 (detailing statistical evidence of the stability of FDI in terms of out-
flows when compared to other forms of capital in the period following the Asian
financial crisis).
176 These measures were aimed primarily at short-term capital flows such as
portfolio investment undertaken by hedge funds and other institutional investors.
The restrictions explicitly excluded FDI which was something that the Malaysian
authorities were at pains to publicize. See Press Release, IMF & World Bank
Group, Statement by Dato Mustapa Mohamed, Second Finance Minister of Ma-
laysia, No. 45 (October 6-8 1998).
177 Reisen, supra note 173, at 21.
178 The MAI definition of "investment" was even broader than that adopted
in NAFTA Chapter 11. See infra Section 5.2.1.
179 DAVID HENDERSON, THE MAI: A STORY AND ITS LESSONS 42 (1999).
180 William H. Witherell, Speaking Notes from the Press Seminar About the
Environment and Labour in the Multilateral Agreement in Investment (Mar. 26,
1998).
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But, by that time, the NGO campaign had succeeded in raising
public opposition to the MAI. Five prominent member states of
the OECD had instituted some form of parliamentary review of the
MAI.181 The review commissioned by the French government was
highly critical of both the negotiation procedure and provisions of
the MAI.182 This report, coupled with a strong concern as to the
treatment of cultural industries under the MAI, led to France's
withdrawal from negotiations on October 14, 1998 (one week be-
fore the MAI negotiations were set to resume). The French with-
drawal signaled the death-knell for the agreement. Less than two
months later, the OECD announced that negotiations would cease,
resulting in no final agreement. 83
5.2. The MAI Provisions: Extending the NAFTA Chapter 11 Model
Various draft texts of the MAI were produced between 1997
and 1998.184 This part of the analysis is based on the last version of
the agreement, which was produced on April 24,1998 and released
by the OECD on the Internet. 85 The draft MAI contains twelve
chapters and encompasses 145 pages. Despite its length, the major-
ity of clauses in the draft text deal with recognized disciplines in
investment liberalization, investment protection, and dispute set-
tlement. 8 6 The MA negotiators referred to these disciplines as the
"three key areas of foreign direct investment rule-making."'8 7 This
is not suprising given that the mandate of the MAI exercise was to
deliver an agreement with "high standards" in those areas. The
181 These member states were Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, and
the United States.
182 See CATHERINE LALUMiRE & JEAN-PIERRE LANDAU, RAPPORT SUR L'ACCORD
MULTILATtRAL SUR L'INVESTISSEMENT (1998).
183 Press Release, OECD, Informal Consultations on International Investment
(Dec. 3,1998).
184 For an overview of the negotiating process leading to the last version of
the agreement, see Dymond, supra note 170, at 28-33.
185 MAI NEGOTIATING TExT, supra note 170. See also OECD, THE MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: COMMENTARY TO THE CONSOLIDATED TEXT, Apr. 22,
1998, DAFFE/MAI(98)/8/REV1 [hereinafter MAI COMMENTARY] (noting general
arguments behind and discussions relating to the drafting of the MAI).
186 MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 170, at 13-56 (ch. III Treatment of In-
vestors and Investments), 56-61 (ch. IV Investment Protection), & 62-75 (ch. V Dis-
pute Settlement).
187 William H. Witherell, Opening Address, in OECD, MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT ON INvEsTmENT: STATE OF PLAY IN APRIL 1997, at 13 (OECD, Working
Articles, Vol. V, No. 51,1997).
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MAI negotiators did go beyond these core issues to consider disci-
plines in what they termed "new matters." 188 However, these
"new matters" were, at least initially, further disciplines of interest
to foreign investors that also includes prohibitions or limits on per-
formance requirements, 8 9 the ability to freely transfer both profit
and capital out of the host state,19 and rights of access and resi-
dence for key foreign personnel.' 91
The next Section of the Article will consider the key compo-
nents of the MAI on scope of application, investment liberalization,
protection, and dispute settlement. Within these core disciplines,
the MAI provisions represented almost a facsimile (albeit strength-
ened in some respects) of the NAFTA Chapter 11 model. In turn,
the facsimile included many of the problems identified in Section 4
of this Article that are inherent in the NAFTA model.
5.2.1. Scope of Application
Like NAFTA, the MAI adopted an asset-based definition of
"investment." 192 However, the MAI went beyond the NAFTA ap-
188 William S. Dymond, State of Play of the MAI Negotiations, in OECD,
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: STATE OF PLAY AS OF FEB. 1997, at 8
(OECD, Working Articles, Vol. V, No. 8,1997).
189 MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 170, at 18-26.
190 Id. at 59-60.
191 Id. at 14-17.
192 Article 2 of Chapter II of the MAI defines "investment" as:
Every kind of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an in-
vestor, including:
(i) an enterprise (being a legal person or any other entity constituted
or organised under the applicable law of the Contracting Party,
whether or not for profit, and whether private or government
owned or controlled, and includes a corporation, trust, partnership,
sole proprietorship, branch, joint venture, association or organisa-
tion);
(ii) shares, stocks or other forms of equity participation in an enter-
prise, and rights derived therefrom;
(iii) bonds, debentures, loans and other forms of debt, and rights de-
rived therefrom;
(iv) rights under contracts, including turnkey, construction, man-
agement, production or revenue-sharing contracts;
(v) claims to money and claims to performance;
(vi) intellectual property rights;
(vii) rights conferred pursuant to law or contract such as conces-
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proach in several important respects. First, the MA definition is
an open definition; it lists items that are included and implies that
non-listed items are also covered. In contrast, Article 1101 of
NAFTA adopts a closed definition of investment, which states
what is included in the definition and what is not. 93 There is also a
more subtle distinction between the two definitions. The NAFTA
definitions require certain assets to have particular characteristics
before they will be defined as an investment and enjoy the benefits
of coverage under that treaty. Characteristics such as the commit-
ment of capital and the assumption of risk delineate the coverage
of investment under NAFTA.194 There is no consideration of these
characteristics in the MAI definition. 195 Again, this may have been
due to the confidence of the negotiators at the commencement of
MAI negotiations. In 1995, the global economy had been marked
by a continuous growth in investment flows since the mid-1980s.
This stability and the desire to draft a "high standards" agreement
may have led MAI negotiators to try to cover as many forms of
capital flow as possible.
This broad approach is unlikely to be acceptable to developing
countries, which have traditionally insisted on the right to regulate
forms of investment less permanent than FDI. Concern as to the
rate of outflow of portfolio investment during the Asian financial
crisis led Malaysia to introduce currency restrictions in September
1998.196 Further, the 1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN
Investment Area explicitly excludes portfolio investment from the
coverage of that agreement.197 Even within the supposedly like-
sions, licenses, authorisations, and permits;
(viii) any other tangible and intangible, movable and immovable
property, and any related property rights, such as leases, mortgages,
liens and pledges.
Id. at 11.
193 See infra Section 4.1.1. (discussing the scope of Article 1101).
194 Id.
195 There is, however, a footnote to the draft Article 2 of Chapter II (which
defines "investment" in the MAI) suggesting that an interpretative note will be
required to set out these characteristics. MAI NEGOTIATING TEX'r, supra note 170, at
11 n.2.
196 See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text (citing sources discussing
the Asian Financial Crisis).
197 Article 2 of the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area
delineates the coverage of the agreement along the following lines: "This Agree-
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minded OECD states, certain delegations argued for the exclusion
of portfolio investment from the MAI definition and others found
it difficult to accept an open definition.198
5.2.2. Investment Liberalization
Like NAFTA, the MAI aimed to liberalize restrictions imposed
on investors by preventing member states from discriminating be-
tween foreign and domestic investors. Again, like NAFTA, the
MAI applied the non-discriminatory standards of national treat-
ment and most-favored-nation treatment to both the pre- and post-
admission phase of the investment process. 199
The inclusion of the MAI model into these sovereignty-based
grounds for excluding entry of foreign investors was also magni-
fied by the way in which the agreement effected liberalization
commitments. Like NAFTA, the MAI adopted a top-down model
of liberalization, the starting point being the rights set out in the
agreement, which ostensibly applied to all economic sectors in the
host state unless exempted in the agreement by the contracting
party. Aside from general exceptions, which applied to all or most
of the MA, 200 member states could also lodge country-specific ex-
ceptions to carve out particular discriminatory legislation from the
operation of the MAI.
201
The top-down structure of the MAI was particularly problem-
atic with regards to the rights of entry provided under the agree-
ment. Given the often sensitive political grounds for restricting en-
try, the top-down approach forces contracting parties to be overly
cautious and lodge extensive exceptions to liberalization commit-
ments. Indeed, in early 1997, the Chairperson of the MAI Negotiat-
ment shall cover all direct investments other than portfolio investments; and mat-
ters relating to investment covered by other ASEAN Agreements, such as the
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services." Framework Agreement on the
ASEAN Investment Area, available at http://www.vietnamese-law-consultancy
.com/intergration/aseanmain.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
198 LESSONS FROM THE MAI, supra note 171, at 11.
199 MAI NEGOTIATING TExT, supra note 170, at 13. The reference to "estab-
lishment" and "acquisition" in the national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment clauses indicate that these provisions were intended to extend to both
pre and post-admission of foreign investment. Id.
200 These general exceptions enabled member states to impose restrictions on
foreign investment on national security, public order, balance of payment, and
prudential and taxation grounds. Id. at 76-88.
201 Id. at 89-94.
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ing Group proposed that member states table their proposed ex-
ceptions prior to completion of the Agreement. The purpose of
this was to reach the highest level of liberalization at the outset by
negotiating away proposed country specific exceptions. The nego-
tiators took the view that "[t]hese [country specific] reservations
will be the essential measuring rod against which can be judged
the value of the rights and obligations of the MAI and, in large
measure, determine the readiness of countries to adhere to the MAL "202
But the Chairperson's proposal led to a surprisingly high num-
ber of exceptions amongst supposedly liberal, like-minded
states.2 3 The potentially unwieldy outcome of this approach was
also exacerbated by the fact that negotiators had not reached a final
agreement on how the MAI would progressively liberalize (or
"rollback") non-conforming country-specific measures. 204
This point reinforces a fundamental difference between apply-
ing non-discriminatory standards in the trade rather than invest-
ment field. A commitment to reduce tariffs on entry of goods will
never involve the political sensitivity of agreeing to the entry of a
foreign investor to the host state. This makes it inherently more
difficult to engender public and political support for a top-down
rather than GATS-like bottom-up approach to investment liberali-
zation. Indeed, the MAI experience has shown that contracting
parties are likely to act cautiously in this respect and submit a veri-
table telephone book of non-conforming measures.
Aside from the non-discriminatory standards of treatment, the
MAI also replicated NAFTA in terms of an absolute prohibition on
the use of a number of performance requirements. 205 But the MAI
prohibition encompasses an even larger number of performance
requirements than NAFTA.206 These requirements go substantially
202 William A. Dymond, The Main Substantive Provisions of the MAI, in OECD,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON
INVESTMENT HELD IN PARIS ON 17 SEPT. 1997, at 16 (OECD, Working Articles, Vol. V,
No. 96,1997) (emphasis added).
203 LESSONS FROM THE MAI, supra note 171, at 12; Commonwealth of Australia
(Department of Treasury), Australia: Revised Schedule of Preliminary Reservations
(Oct. 1997). Australia's reservations to the MAI essentially preserved most of its
current system of regulating and screening the entry of foreign investors under its
Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act, 1975 (Austl.) and accompanying Minis-
terial statements.
204 MAI COMMENTARY, supra note 185, at 60.
203 MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 170, at 18-26.
206 For example, the MAI goes beyond the NAFTA approach in prohibiting a
member host state from imposing performance requirements such as location of
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beyond the illustrative list in the TRIMS Agreement and include
common mechanisms such as technology transfer requirements
used by developing countries in their economic planning proc-
esses.
5.2.3. Investment Protection
Chapter IV of the MAI sets out the investment protection pro-
visions of the draft MAI. Like NAFTA, the MAI contains strong
provisions requiring host states to compensate investors in the
event of expropriation of their investment.2 7 These provisions
cover direct as well as indirect expropriations, with the latter cov-
ering governmental measures "having an equivalent effect" to a
direct expropriation.20 8 The MAI provisions also replicate the
drafting flaw in Article 1110 of NAFTA. There is no guidance
within the MAI provisions as to whether normal regulatory
changes that negatively affect the value of an investment would be
covered within the concept of an indirect expropriation. Instead,
the MAI negotiators simply assumed that this broad formulation
would be accepted as:
[t]he draft [expropriation provision] has many similarities
with well-known investment protection provisions found
in hundreds of bilateral investment protection agreements.
This is no surprise because it was never the intention of the
negotiating partners to "re-invent the wheel," but rather to
add some more spokes in order to strengthen the whole ve-
hicle.209
The investment protection provisions also duplicate NAFTA
Article 1105 by requiring member states to provide "fair and equi-
table treatment and full and constant protection and security"
while ensuring a minimum standard of treatment of "that required
by international law."210
headquarters, research and development, employment of nationals, domestic joint
venture participation, and minimum and maximum level of equity participation.
See id. at 20-21 (referring to sections 1(g), (i), (j), (k), and (I), respectively).
207 Id. at 56-57.
208 Id. at 56.
209 Joachim Karl, Investment Protection, in OECD, supra note 178, at 14.
210 MAI NEGOTIATING TExT, supra note 170, at 56.
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This unwillingness to critically assess the broad NAFTA ap-
proach to investment protection is symptomatic of the approach of
the negotiators to the MAI exercise generally. It was only in 1998
that the MAI negotiators made a belated attempt to address some
of the public concerns (engendered largely by the NGO campaign)
about the broad operation of the NAFTA-inspired investment pro-
tection provisions.
5.2.4. Dispute Settlement
Like NAFTA, the MAI contains both state-to-state and investor-
to-state dispute settlement procedures. 21' It is notable that some
countries objected to the extension of the investor-state dispute
resolution procedure to the pre-establishment phase of the invest-
ment process. There was some concern about giving potential in-
vestors the standing to file a claim against a host state in which
they were planning to invest.212
5.2.5. Absences
Like NAFTA, the MAI largely ignored the question of invest-
ment incentives. The provisions on performance requirements ex-
plicitly condone the use of incentives if linked to certain perform-
ance requirements. 2 3 For incentives not linked to performance
requirements, there are a variety of bracketed texts within the MAI.
These range from texts which state that several delegations believe
that no provisions are necessary,214 a proposal for considering the
disciplines on incentives as part of the MAI built-in agenda for fu-
ture work,215 to a variety of articles that try to restrict the use of in-
centives from applying non-discriminatory standards of treatment
to notification requirements under the MAI.216
The MAI also did not initially include a broad GATT Article
XX-type exception. Instead, the MAI approach reflected the
NAFTA model of strong liberalization and protection provisions
with the ability of host states to exempt particular national meas-
ures as country-specific exceptions. But this limited approach
211 Id. at 62-76.
212 See LESSONS FROM THE MAI, supra note 171, at 19.
213 MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 170, at 22.
214 Id. at 45.
216 Id. at 46.
216 Id. at 46-47.
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changed dramatically late in the negotiations in March of 1998. In
the face of growing NGO and public opposition, the Chairperson
of the MAI Negotiating Group released a package of changes to the
text in an attempt to address the impact of the strong MAI provi-
sions on core aspects of regulatory competency.217 The Chairper-
son's package is notable as the MAI is arguably the first ever multi-
lateral commercial agreement to directly amend its provisions to
take into account NGO concerns. It is considered next.
5.3. Another Retreat: The Chairperson's Package Proposing Changes
to the MAI
A draft of the MAI was leaked to Public Citizen, a U.S. con-
sumer NGO, in February 1997.218 Up until that date, the MAI had
been a confidential working document. Public Citizen immedi-
ately published the draft negotiating text on the Internet, where it
became "available to anyone with a computer and a modem."
219
The release of the negotiating text on the Internet led to an explo-
sion of concern about the MAI amongst a bewildering range of
NGOs. Environmental groups joined with domestic trade unions,
international human rights groups, developmental bodies, reli-
gious organizations, and churches in opposing the MAI.22°
Much of the NGO opposition to the MAI was based on a gen-
eral anxiety about the process of economic globalization and fo-
cused on issues such as the increasing economic power of transna-
tional corporations 221 and the impact of the MAI on the sovereignty
217 OECD, CHAIRMAN'S NOTE ON ENVIRONMENT AND RELATED MATTERS ON
LABOUR, DAFFE/MAI(98)10 (Mar. 9,1998) [hereinafter CHAIRMAN'S NOTE].
218 Kobrin, supra note 172, at 98.
219 Id.
220 For an indication of the types of NGOs that opposed the MAI, see gener-
ally Kobrin, supra note 172 (discussing the NGO ambush of the MAI); MAUDE
BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, MAI: THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT AND
THE THREAT TO AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998) (examining the North American NGO
campaign against the MAI); STOPPING THE JUGGERNAUT: PUBLIC INTEREST VERSUS
THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT Games Goodman & Patricia Ranald
eds., 2000) (examining the different NGOs opposed to the MAI in Australia and
their interaction with groups in other countries).
221 For example, a prominent Canadian NGO characterized the MAI as "a
power grab for transnational corporations that would end up hijacking the fun-
damental democratic rights and freedoms of peoples all over the world." POLARIS
INSTITUTE, TOWARDS A CrIzENs' MAI: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO DEVELOPING A
GLOBAL INVESTMENT TREATY BASED ON CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL,
available at http://www.germanwatch.org/tw/citizmai.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2002).
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of host states.22 Aside from their broad concerns with economic
globalization, NGOs also used a more specific argument against
the MAI; its facsimile of the NAFTA model and likely impact on
the regulatory autonomy of host states. NGOs particularly focused
on the close similarity between the investment protection provi-
sions between NAFTA and the MAI. The settlement of the arbitral
dispute brought by Ethyl Corporation against Canada under
NAFTA Chapter 11 towards the end of the MAI negotiations also
brought impetus to these claims.223 The concern that the MAI (by
replicating NAFTA Article 1110-type protection against indirect
expropriation) would inhibit normal regulatory measures under-
lined much of specific NGO opposition to the MAI:
222 For example, the Western Governors' Association, an American advocacy
NGO, prepared a report easily accessible on its Internet web-site that detailed
state-by-state specific laws that might be threatened were the United States to sign
the MA. WESTERN GOvERNORS' ASSOCIATION, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON
INVESTMENT: POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT, available at
http://wvw.westgov.org/wga/publicat/maiweb.htm (last visited Oct. 13,2002).
The same approach was taken by Friends of the Earth, an international environ-
mental NGO, which cited a variety of pro-environmental laws, which it claimed
would be contrary to the MAI. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, EXAMPLES OF LAWS THAT
WOULD CONFLICT wrrH THE MAI, available at http://www.foe.org/international
/trade/mai/shortlaws.html (last visited Jun. 8, 1999). In contrast, the text of the
MAI, which was released by the OECD on the Internet, did not include the coun-
try-specific exceptions lodged by member states to the MAI. MAI NEGOTIATING
TEXr, supra note 170. This led to the mistaken perception that all laws that dis-
criminated against foreign investors (even in sensitive policy areas) would be lib-
eralized.
223 In 1997, the Canadian government banned the import and inter-provincial
transport of a fuel additive known as MMT. The purpose of the ban was ostensi-
bly environmental; the Canadian government took the view that MMT was a di-
rect source of harmful air pollutants and also caused more sophisticated automo-
tive pollution control devices to malfunction. However, the ban did not prohibit
the production and sale of MMT in Canada. As such, this legislative approach
effectively prevented the sale of foreign-made MMvTT but not domestically-made
MMT in Canada. Ethyl Corporation, a U.S. company, was an importer and dis-
tributor of MMT in Canada. Ethyl challenged the ban under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA, arguing that the ban breached Articles 1102 (National Treatment), 1106
(Performance Requirements), and 1110 (Expropriation), and claimed damages of
U.S. $251 million. Canada responded to Ethyl Corporation's claims by challeng-
ing the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. In June 1998, the arbitrators rejected
most of Canada's challenge and postponed the rest to a consideration with the
merits of the case. But the tribunal never reached a decision on the merits. In July
1998, presumably in response to the adverse decision on jurisdiction, Canada
agreed to settle the dispute, lift its ban on MIMT, and pay Ethyl Corporation U.S.
$13 million in compensation. The settlement occurred at the height of the NGO
campaign against the MAI. For a summary description of the facts in the dispute,
see NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal: Ethyl Corporation v. The Government
of Canada (Award on Jurisdiction) vol. 38,38 I.L.M. 708,710-17 (June 24,1998).
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Perhaps the greatest environmental threat the MAI poses is
that, under the investor-state dispute procedure, any new
laws to protect the environment, wilderness, species or
natural resource production could be considered a form of
"expropriation" and foreign investors would have the right
to sue for compensation before an international tribunal
made up of unelected trade bureaucrats.224
The NGO campaign reaped dividends on this point late in the
negotiations. On March 9,1998, the Chairperson of the MAI Nego-
tiating Group released a package proposing changes to the draft
MAI "to achieve balance between MAI disciplines and other im-
portant areas of public policy of concern to MAI Parties and to
avoid unintended consequences on normal regulatory practices."2
25
The package contains a variety of different initiatives varying
in degrees of strength and specificity. At one end of the spectrum,
it proposed the inclusion of preambular references to international
declarations on the environment and labor. At the other end of the
spectrum, there were more substantive attempts to address some
of the problems of replicating the NAFTA Chapter 11 model.
Within the liberalization commitments, the package proposed an
interpretative note to the national treatment and most-favored-
nation treatment provisions regarding the impact of the phrase "in
like circumstances." 226 The intent of this note was to deal with the
difficult problem of determining when de facto discrimination will
constitute a breach of the national treatment norm. The underlying
aim of the interpretative note was to "preserve the necessary scope
for non-discriminatory regulation."22 7 Of itself, there is little sub-
224 BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 220, at 60 (emphasis added).
225 CHAIRMAN' NoTE, supra note 217, at 2.
226 The relevant part of that interpretative note reads:
[G]overnments may have legitimate policy reasons to accord differential
treatment to different types of investments .... The fact that a measure
applied by a government has a different effect on an investment or inves-
tor of another Party would not in itself render the measure inconsistent
with national treatment and most favoured nation treatment .... The
objective of "in like circumstances" is to permit the consideration of all
relevant circumstances, including those relating to a foreign investor and
its investments, in deciding to which domestic or third country investors
and investments they should appropriately be compared.
Id. at5.
227 Id. at 2.
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stantive guidance within the note. However, it may have provided
an arbitral tribunal with a mandate to consider a broad range of
circumstances (possibly including the policy objectives evident
from the design and structure of a given regulatory measure) in its
deliberative process. By comparison, NAFTA tribunals to date
have largely taken a very restrictive view of similar wording in Ar-
ticle 1102.22
The Chairperson's package also proposed an interpretative
note to deal with the broad coverage of the MAI investment protec-
tion provisions.229 But this interpretative note attempts to remedy
the broad scope of the MAI provisions with similarly broad inter-
pretative language. This could conceivably lead to the kind of sec-
ond-guessing of governmental intent in passing regulatory meas-
ures evident in the NAFTA Chapter 11 cases such as S.D. Myers.
For example, an arbitral tribunal considering whether a given
regulatory initiative is a "measure tantamount to expropriation"
could then, under the interpretative note, try to discern whether it
could be justified as being "in the public interest." It is difficult to
see how an arbitral tribunal (summoned, in part, by the initiation
of an action by a foreign investor) is qualified to make this kind of
judgment. This highlights the problem of trying to tinker with the
edges of a substantive provision that has its origins in another time
and place. The strong guarantees of investment protection in both
the MAI and NAFTA have their bases in similar BIT language de-
22= See supra note 129 and accompanying text on the analysis of "like circum-
stances" in the S.D. Myers case. See also In the Matter of an Arbitration Under Chap-
ter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement Between Pope & Talbot, Inc. and
the Government of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, paras. 73-104, (Apr. 10,
2001) (providing an example of NAFTA's interpretation of Article 1102), available
at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/AwardMerits-e.pdf.
229 The interpretative note reads:
Interpretative Note: Articles-on General Treatment, and-on Expropria-
tion and Compensation [sic], are intended to incorporate into the MAI
existing international legal norms. The reference in Article IV.2.1 to ex-
propriation or nationalisation and "measures tantamount to expropria-
tion or nationalisation" reflects the fact that international law requires
compensation for an expropriatory taking without regard to the label
applied to it, even if title to the property is not taken. It does not establish
a new requirement that Parties pay compensation for losses which an investor or
investment may incur through regulation, revenue raising and other normal ac-
tivity in the public interest undertaken by governments. Nor would such
normal and non-discriminatory government activity contravene the
standards in Article-.1 (General Treatment) (emphasis added).
CHAIMAN'S NOTE, supra note 217, at 6.
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veloped in response to threats of expropriation in the 1950s and
1960s. Within the context of a proposed WTO investment agree-
ment, WTO negotiators should consider carefully whether such
broad language is warranted in a global economy marked by in-
creasing competition to attract foreign investment.
The Chairperson's package extended beyond proposing inter-
pretative notes to suggesting direct amendments to provisions in
the MAI text. These included a NAFTA-inspired provision requir-
ing member states not to lower domestic standards to attract in-
vestment 230 and a proposal to annex the non-binding OECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises to the text of the MAI.231 Other
amendments addressed existing provisions such as the proposal
for a limited exception to the prohibition on performance require-
ments to allow certain requirements to be undertaken for environ-
mental reasons.232  But these were not the only substantive
changes. The package goes so far as to suggest a provision affirm-
ing the right of member states to pass domestic regulatory meas-
ures otherwise consistent with the MAI: "A Contracting Party may
adopt, maintain or enforce any measure that it considers appropri-
ate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns, provided such
measures are consistent with this agreement."233
This proposal is somewhat puzzling. It is largely meaningless,
as it only applies to measures consistent with the MAI. If a regula-
tory measure complies with the non-discriminatory and other
norms in the MA, it will already be valid under the agreement. If
the proposal's intention was to provide some form of exception for
domestic regulatory measures, then the exception would logically
have to apply to initiatives inconsistent with the MAI (which is the
approach underlying GATT Article XX). The Chairperson's pack-
230 The provision states:
A Contracting Party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer
to waive or otherwise derogate from, its domestic health, safety, envi-
ronmental, or labour measures, as an encouragement to the establish-
ment, acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use,
enjoyment and sale or other disposition of an investment of an investor.
Id. at6.
231 Id. at 7.
232 Id. at 6-7. This proposed change basically replicates Article 1106(6) of
NAFTA.
233 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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age describes this proposal as a "targeted approach," but notes that
"[a]nother approach would be a general exception inspired by
GATT Article XX." 234 Thus, in other words, the proposal is con-
ceived as a form of exception that is mostly semantic.
The Chairperson's package encapsulates some of the problems
in trying to deal with the impact of broad liberalization and protec-
tion provisions on regulatory autonomy through an exception-type
amendment. In the context of a possible WTO investment agree-
ment, the next Section of the Article will posit an alternative and, it
is suggested, more stable response to this problem by suggesting a
series of proposals to carefully delineate and define the operative
provisions of such an agreement.
6. THE WTO, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND THE DOHA AGENDA
With the specter of the failed Seattle WTO Ministerial Confer-
ence in 1999 and on-going public demonstrations against economic
globalization, VVTO members were under great pressure to reach
an agreement at the Doha Ministerial Conference in late 2001. In
the lead-up to the Doha talks, a number of proposals were floated
in order to breach expected opposition by developing countries to
the inclusion of investment rules on the negotiating agenda. Most
notably, the EU put forward a proposal for an essentially multilat-
eral approach, enabling countries to opt out of final investment
rules.235 Interestingly, at least in the initial stages of preparatory
discussion before the Doha Ministerial Conference, the large cau-
cus of developing countries under the "Group of 77" umbrella did
not seem as implacably opposed to the inclusion of investment
rules as expected.236 Yet, within this broad grouping, there was
strong opposition by the so-called "Like Minded Group" of India,
Malaysia and Pakistan, who resisted commencing negotiations on
investment and merely sought further study on the possibility. 237
234 Id. at 2.
235 See Neue WTO-Runde dank EU-Flexibiaet, NEUE ZOERCHER ZEIrUNG, Feb. 24-
25, 2001, at 10; Draft Declaration Presses for Decision on Investment, Competition, 1,
16-18 (39) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 17 (Sept. 28, 2001).
236 Group of 77 Pushes Concessions in Agriculture, Open to Investment Talks, 19
(43) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 17-18 (Oct. 26,2001) [hereinafter Concessions in Agriculture].
237 Decision on Investment, Competition Talks Likely to Be Delayed, Special Report,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 3, 4 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Decision on Investment]. In par-
ticular, India has long opposed the inclusion of investment on the negotiating
agenda of the WTO. See generally Satya P. Das, An Indian Perspective on WTO
Rules on Direct Foreign Investment, presented at the WTO South Asia Workshop
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But on the whole, developing countries were more concerned with
matters such as the elimination of agricultural export subsidies,238
reform of the use of anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws,239
further talks on textiles240 and the reform of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to enable
governments to take necessary steps to protect public health.241
Not surprisingly, developing countries opposed the inclusion of
environmental rules in the WTO, an area promoted strongly by the
EU.242
In a break from the past, the United States was not as strong a
demandeur for the commencement of investment negotiations in the
Doha agenda.243 This may have been as a result of the failure of the
primarily U.S.-backed MAI, the ongoing difficulties in the interpre-
tation of Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the inter-agency disputes
within the Bush administration on the extent to which language for
future bilateral agreements with Singapore and Chile and even the
regional FTAA should diverge from the NAFTA Chapter 11
model.244 Instead, the other members of the Triad (Japan and the
EU) pushed forcefully for the commencement of negotiations on
in New Delhi (Dec. 1999) (offering a critique of the Indian negotiating position on
the inclusion of investment on the negotiating agenda of the WTO).
23 Concessions in Agriculture, supra note 236.
239 The anti-dumping procedure under the Uruguay Round Antidumping
Agreement (that can lead to the imposition of anti-dumping duties) tends to be
typically initiated by developed states-particularly the United States, Australia,
Canada and the EU-whilst developing countries are most often defendants
rather than complainants. See generally WTO, ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2000) (reporting
on various nations' stances on anti-dumping); TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 46,
at 166-71 (detailing further information on the initiation of anti-dumption actions).
The desire of developing countries to commence negotiations for reform of the
anti-dumping rules to prevent disproportionate use of anti-dumping measures is
detailed in Concessions in Agriculture, supra note 236, at 17; WTO Draft Declaration
Proposes AD Negotiations, Delays Environment, Special Report, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1-2
(Oct. 30, 2001).
240 Concessions in Agriculture, supra note 236, at 17-18.
241 TRIPS-Public Health Declaration Splits Developing, Developed Nations, 19 (39)
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 11, 12 (Sep. 28, 2001).
242 Lamy Says EU Must Have Ability to Negotiate Environment in WTO, 19 (45)
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 11-12 (Nov. 9, 2001).
243 At Doha, U.S. Aims to Postpone Decision on Dumping, Weighs EU Plan, 19
(45) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1-2 (Nov. 9, 2001).
244 See supra Section 4.3 (detailing the inter-agency deadlock and uncertainty
in future trade and investment initiatives involving the United States).
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investment.245 The strategic interests of the United States appear to
have been to resist the push for negotiations to reform the use of
anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures while advocating
reform of agricultural rules to assist U.S. producers.
246
6.1. The Doha Ministerial Declaration
The broad divergences between WTO member states in the
lead up to the Doha Ministerial Conference set the scene for trad-
ing compensatory bargains across separate issues to achieve con-
sensus for the start of negotiations. Unlike the failed Seattle Minis-
terial Conference in 1999, WNTO Ministers succeeded in agreeing to
an agenda to commence negotiations. The overall outcome of the
Doha Ministerial Conference was to launch immediate negotia-
tions on nine different topics,247 eight of which are to be concluded
as a single undertaking248 by January 1, 2005. The eight are imple-
mentation, agriculture, services, industrial tariffs, subsidies, anti-
dumping, regional trade agreements and the environment. Nego-
tiations on reform of the dispute settlement rules are to be con-
cluded by May 2003.
From the perspective of developing countries, it might be
slightly ambitious to describe the Doha agenda as a development
round of negotiations. However, there were three primary areas of
interest for developing countries included in the single undertak-
ing negotiations. First, implementation of existing commitments is
an issue for negotiations in its own right, together with a separate
Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.249 De-
245 See supra note 237, at 4 (detailing last-minute efforts by the EU and Japan
to secure support from developing countries for the inclusion of investment in the
Doha agenda).
246 Zoellick Raises Two Objections to WTO Draft Declaration, 19 (44) INSIDE U.S.
TRADE 21-22 (Nov. 2,2001).
247 These are Inplementation ( 12), Agriculture ( 13), Services ( 15), In-
dustrial tariffs ( 16), Subsidies ( 28), Anti-dumping ( 28), Regional Trade
agreements ( 29), Environment ( 31), and on a separate track, the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding ( 30). See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5. For
an analysis of these topics as well as the Doha Declaration, see generally Interna-
tional Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, The Doha Declaration's
Meaning Depends on the Reader, 5 (9) BRIDGES (Nov./Dec. 2001).
248 The concept of a single undertaking means that nothing is finalized until
negotiations are concluded in all areas. For an illustration of this point, see Doha
Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, 47.
249 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, 12 (separating issues of imple-
mentation and concerns); WTO, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns,
WT/MIN(01)/17 20 (Nov. 14,2001).
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veloping countries have expressed concern with the lack of imple-
mentation of existing commitments virtually since the coming into
force of the Uruguay Round set of agreements. Further, develop-
ing countries have succeeded in including anti-dumping and sub-
sidy reform amongst the topics for immediate negotiation. The
Doha declaration also contains long, substantial sections on topics
such as technical assistance, capacity building, and least-
developed-countries. 250 Aside from the negotiating program, a
general work program was also launched on priority issues for de-
veloping countries such as trade and debt,25' finance and technol-
ogy transfer,252 as well as special and differential treatment.25 3
On the opposite side of the ledger, developing countries failed
to include legally-binding language in the TRIPS Agreement to en-
able them to address public health emergencies. This was strongly
resisted by the pharmaceutical industry on the basis that it would
act as a giant carve-out for the TRIPS Agreement.25 4 Instead, a
separate Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
contains a political statement supportive of public health.255 Out-
side of the context of implementation issues, no substantial pro-
gress was made on further market access for textile products, a
long-standing issue of interest for developing countries. This re-
mains an inherently sensitive topic in many developed states, par-
ticularly the United States. Similarly, the issue of movement of
people (rather than movement of goods or capital) was not ad-
dressed in the Doha agenda. While this is not suprising (given the
even more politically sensitive aspects of this topic since the terror-
250 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, 38-43.
251 Id. 36.
252 Id. 37.
253 Id. 44.
254 See Fight over TRIPS Narrowed to Whether Declaration Would Be Binding, Spe-
cial Report, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 3 (Nov. 13, 2001); WTO Countries in Deadlock on
TRIPS, 1 (43) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 22-23 (Oct. 26, 2001) (reporting on the pharma-
ceutical industry's objections to public health provisions).
255 See WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), which reads as follows:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly,
while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm
that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and,
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
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ist attacks of September 11), this issue is of considerable interest to
developing countries, given their comparative advantage in this
area.
256
Among the developed states, the EU scored a major victory
with the immediate launch of negotiations on certain, albeit lim-
ited, environmental initiatives.257 As a trade-off, the EU agreed to
relatively strong language in the agricultural mandate, particularly
on reducing export subsidies.258 This is an area which pits the
European Union against most of the WTO member states (and to a
large degree, the United States). For the purposes of this Article,
investment (pushed largely by the EU) was not included in the set
of topics for immediate negotiations. There is, however, reference
to the start of negotiations on investment rules in the future. Un-
expectediy, ambiguity surrounds the exact parameters of this part
of the Doha agenda.
6.2. Is There Really an Agreement to Commence Negotiations on
Investment?
The most confusing aspect of the Doha Ministerial Conference
revolves around the so-called Singapore issues of investment,
competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilita-
tion.259 On each of these issues, the Doha declaration provides that
256 See generally TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 46, at 484-99 (analyzing the
welfare implications of greater immigration flows and the absence of international
rules on this issue). The on-going negotiations between the United States and
Chile on a proposed FTA highlight the tensions involved in this area. Chile (with
the support of the U.S. service industry) has consistently pushed for the inclusion
of rights providing temporary entry for services personnel. This has been strin-
gently opposed by the United States out of concern over their impact on immigra-
tion. U.S. Resists Chile Services Visa Push, but Looks for Model Accord, 20 (2) INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Jan. 11, 2002, at 1, 20-21.
257 The agreement to commence negotiations on the environment are limited
to three approved areas: (i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and to
the trade obligations in multilateral environmental agreements; (ii) the reduction
of trade barriers to the sale of environmental goods and services; (iii) to clarify
and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies. Doha Ministerial Declaration,
supra note 5, $ 31.
253 The relevant part of the negotiating agenda reads, "Building on the work
carried out to date and without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations we
commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improve-
ments in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of ex-
port subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support."
Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, 13.
259 In the lead-up to the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996, de-
veloped countries pushed for the commencement of negotiations on each of these
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members, "agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth
Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be
taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotia-
tions."26
0
Developed members of the WTO, such as the United States,
viewed this language as a mandate to launch negotiations at the
fifth Ministerial Conference in Mexico in 2003, but some develop-
ing countries have opposed this interpretation. In the last hours of
the Doha conference, India extracted a statement from the Qatari
Trade Minister Youssef Kamal in his role as the Chair of the Minis-
terial Conference, in which he stated that:
[M]y understanding is that at that [fifth Ministerial] ... de-
cision would indeed need to be taken by explicit consensus
before negotiations on [the Singapore issues] could pro-
ceed.., in my view, this would give each member the right
to take positions on modalities that would prevent negotia-
tions from proceeding after the Fifth Session of the Ministe-
rial Conference until that Member is prepared to join an
explicit consensus. 261
The legal status of this statement is unclear. It is not attached
to the official Ministerial Conference Declaration itself. Further,
this interpretation seems at odds with the agreement in the Doha
Declaration to treat "[t]he negotiations to be pursued under the
terms of this Declaration" as "parts of a single undertaking." 262
This issue is also linked to the reciprocal balance of concessions
topics. The resistance of developing countries led to a compromise whereby Min-
isters only agreed to establish working groups to study the issues surrounding
these topics. WTO, World Trade Organization: Singapore Ministerial Declaration
WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 13, 1996) vol. 36, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997), $ 20-23. For an
overview of negotiations between developed and developing countries on in-
vestment in the lead up to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, see also ZDENEK
DRABEK, A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: CONVINCING THE SCEPTICS 9
(WTO, Staff Working Article ERAD 98 05, 1998) (providing background informa-
tion on the negotiations); Smythe, supra note 163, at 108-12.
260 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, 20 (Investment), 23 (Compe-
tition Policy), 26 (Government Procurement), & 27 (Trade Facilitation) (em-
phasis added).
261 For a description of the Indian position as well as an excerpt of the Chair-
man's statement, see Note from Qatar Chairman Yields Uncertainty on New WTO Is-
sues, 19 (47) INSIDE U.S. TRADE 15,16 (Nov. 23, 2001).
262 See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, $$ 45,47.
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within the overall Doha agenda. If the commencement of negotia-
tions (rather than the modalities on which they proceed) on these
issues were blocked, then demandeur entities, like the EU and Ja-
pan, could justifiably see the negotiating package as unbalanced
and resist negotiations in other areas.
Given the historical resistance of some developing countries to
the issue of multilateral investment rules, it would seem that the
demandeur countries will need to do two things to ensure negotia-
tions start on investment in Mexico in 2003. First, careful consid-
eration to developing countries' interests on issues other than in-
vestment within the agreed negotiating agenda (such as long-
standing concerns on implementation of existing commitments)
will go a long way to building consensus for the start of investment
negotiations. Second, in the lead-up to the 2003 WTO Ministerial
Conference, the work undertaken by the WTO Working Group on
the Relationship between Trade and Investment in developing a
framework for a proposed WTO investment agreement could also
play a significant role in ensuring the start of negotiations in
2003.263 This will depend upon the extent to which the proposed
framework for a WTO investment agreement balances both the in-
terests of developed and developing countries. The next Section of
the Article will put forward a series of suggestions for a WTO in-
vestment agreement, which attempt to achieve this aim. In doing
so, the proposals tie together the lines of inquiry and lessons dis-
cerned from the analyses of NAFTA Chapter 11 and the MAI in the
earlier Sections of this Article.
6.3. Suggestions for a WTO Investment Agreement
There are four principles that should shape any effort in struc-
turing a framework for a WTO investment agreement. First, de-
veloping countries are unlikely to accept a "high standards"
NAFTA or MAI-like model on investment liberalization and pro-
tection. Indeed, there is a need to shift away from the perception
that negotiation of investment rules is a zero-sum game with the
only outcome being either full liberalization or full protection-
ism. 264 Liberalization of investment restrictions (especially on the
263 The Doha Declaration explicitly envisages that the Working Group on the
Relationship Between Trade and Investment undertake this type of work in the
period leading up to the Fifth Ministerial Conference in 2003. Id.
264 This valuable point on the way past investment negotiations have been
perceived is set out in Muchlinski, supra note 168, at 133.
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question of admission of foreign investment) is an inherently po-
litically sensitive process. Further, unlike tariff negotiations, these
restrictions cannot be negotiated incrementally and there is uncer-
tainty as to the quantification of the benefits in removing some re-
strictions, such as certain performance requirements. A WTO in-
vestment agreement will need to balance the clear benefits that can
result from increased liberalization (and investment flows) with
the reality that some countries will continue to take restrictive
measures whether for political or developmental purposes.
265
Second, the foregoing analysis has revealed a number of on-
going difficulties with the NAFTA Chapter 11 model, particularly
in regard to the issue of regulatory autonomy. The WTO negotia-
tors should not simply look to the NAFTA precedent as the only
model available. The MAI negotiators unsuccessfully looked to the
NAFTA Chapter 11 model and the inconclusive result raises a fun-
damental issue. Parts of the extremely strong provisions on liber-
alization, protection, and dispute settlement in the NAFTA Chap-
ter 11 model are rooted in another time and place. In particular,
the broad wording of the investment protection provisions (largely
borrowed from similar U.S. BITs) was designed to deliver stability
in the face of hostile expropriatory behavior by newly independent
states in the Cold War era. In the last few decades, most develop-
ing countries have moved away from this type of behavior and
have unilaterally begun to liberalize their national investment poli-
cies within developmental parameters, such as the use of perform-
ance requirements. Hence, broad and often undefined provisions
in NAFTA, such as Articles 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treat-
ment) and 1110 (Expropriation) seem somewhat anachronous in
the current international environment. Foreign investors are now
more interested in gaining entry and freedom to operate in a host
state. Thus, the strategic focus of a WTO framework on investment
should be more towards implementing liberalization commitments
rather than guarantees of strict investment protection.
Third, WTO negotiators should be concerned with the likely
prospect of NGO oversight. The perceived success of the NGO
265 This point is also replicated in the Doha agenda itself. The proposed work
to be undertaken in the WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade
and Investment in advance of the Mexico Ministerial Conference in developing a
framework "should reflect in a balanced manner the interests of home and host
countries, and take due account of the development policies and objectives of host
governments as well as their right to regulate in the public interest." Doha Minis-
terial Declaration, supra note 5, 22.
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campaign against the MAI episode (as well as on-going concern
from many NGOs with NAFTA Chapter 11) will spark similar op-
position by these groups in future investment initiatives. At a
minimum, WTO negotiators should strive for a greater degree of
transparency in the negotiating process than that shown in the
MAI episode. A clear explanation of the objectives and compo-
nents of a WTO investment agreement may in fact pre-empt some
NGO concerns.
Fourth, NGO oversight is in many ways linked to the greater
emphasis in developed states (particularly the EU) on the so-called
linkages between international economic initiatives and matters
such as the environment and labor. These issues should not be
simply dismissed as protectionist tendencies driven by interest
groups in developed states. Instead, WTO negotiators should aim
to recapture some of the broadness of vision encapsulated within
the Havana Charter that set down a mix of liberal and regulatory
initiatives. This may, to some degree, conflict with the interests of
developing countries who have historically resisted initiatives in
this area. But increasingly, matters such as the relationship be-
tween investment flows and domestic environmental and labor
standards cannot be artificially separated. The key to resolving
this tension will be to devise reasonable proposals that balance di-
vergent interests in this area.
Incorporating these four underlying themes, the following are
modest but realistic suggestions for the drafting of a WTO invest-
ment agreement:
6.3.1. Scope: A Narrower Definition of"Investment"
The way in which "investment" is defined will be crucial in de-
lineating the scope of operation of a WTO investment agreement.
Developing countries are unlikely to accept coverage of short-term
and often speculative capital flows, such as portfolio investment.
Hence, WTO negotiators should aim to develop a narrower, asset-
based definition of "investment" than that set out in NAFTA and
the MAI. At one end of the spectrum, negotiators could simply
limit the coverage of the agreement to FDI. Alternatively, the defi-
nition of "investment" could go beyond FDI to encompass a closed
list of assets that the negotiating group is able to reach consensus
on. This list of assets could isolate the key characteristics of the
types of capital flow of most benefit to developing states. For ex-
ample, other assets that could conceivably fall within this category
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are intra-firm debt or even debt with a relatively long-term per-
spective. If developing states agreed to go beyond FDI to include
other forms of capital, this could be used to garner further conces-
sions from developed countries in areas of strategic interest such as
disciplines on the use of investment incentives.
6.3.2. Liberalization
The non-discriminatory standards of national and most-
favored-nation treatment should remain as the cornerstone of a
WTO investment agreement. However, the question remains as to
what forms of national regulation these standards should apply.
This difficult question breaks down into two sub-questions. First,
to which of the de jure discriminatory measures (as described in
Section 3) should the liberalization provisions apply? For example,
should a WTO agreement extend to pre-admission restrictions?
Further, should there be some limitation on the use of investment
incentives? How should a WTO investment agreement deal with
the problem of de facto discriminatory measures? That is, how
should the investment agreements deal with those regulatory
measures which do not on their face discriminate against foreign
investors but have some incidental, adverse impact? The following
are possible solutions to these questions.
6.3.2.1. Pre-Admission Restrictions: A GATS Bottom-Up
Structure
Entry by foreign investors into a host state is an inherently po-
litically sensitive question. As such, a WTO agreement could sim-
ply exclude the coverage of national and most-favored-nation
treatment from the pre-admission phase of the investment process.
This would allow host states to freely regulate the question of entry
by investors. But, as an alternative option (considering the likeli-
hood of the demandeurs pushing forcefully for some kind of treat-
ment of pre-establishment restrictions), the WTO negotiators could
consider a GATS-like, bottom-up approach to scheduling commit-
ments on pre-establishment matters. 266 This would then give host
266 Indeed, this is envisaged in the set of issues to be addressed by the WTO
Working Group on Trade and Investment in the lead-up to the Mexico Ministerial
Conference. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, 22 (listing areas that
the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment will focus
on for clarification ).
[23:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss4/3
2002] WTO GENERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT 783
states significant discretion to specify which economic sectors of
the national economy would be open to entry by foreign investors.
6.3.2.2. Post-Admission Restrictions: A Top-Down Structure
Once an investor enters into a host state, most restrictions im-
posed on it are motivated by the desire to fully capture the eco-
nomic benefits of the foreign investment. For these restrictions, a
WTO agreement should follow the stricter NAFTA and MAI ap-
proach of applying liberalization conditions on a top-down basis.
Under this approach, the liberalization conditions would apply
across all economic sectors and national laws of a WTO member
unless specifically exempted by the submission of a negative-list of
such measures. Careful consideration will need to be given as to
the techniques in which to affect a system of progressive liberaliza-
tion of these non-conforming measures. The guiding principle
should be one of caution by specifying realistic time periods in
which to initiate such procedures.
6.3.2.3. The Grand Bargain: Investment
Incentives/Performance Requirements
A WTO investment agreement should discipline the use of in-
vestment incentives. This is an area in which developing countries
can potentially gain the most from an investment agreement. In-
centives are arguably as economically distortive as negative restric-
tions on foreign investors, such as performance requirements. Fur-
ther, developing states are at a comparative disadvantage to
developed states in their use of incentives. However, the absence
of such disciplines in both the MAI and NAFTA evidences the his-
torical resistance in the OECD states to disciplining these forms of
positive discrimination in favor of foreign investors.
On the other side of the ledger, it would not be unexpected for
developed states to seek to expand the list of performance re-
quirements subject to the TRIMS Agreement in a WTO investment
agreement.267 This scenario would provide WTO negotiators with
the type of intra-issue linkage to meet the strategic interests of both
267 For example, the United States has long opposed the use of technology
transfer requirements, which are not explicitly covered by the TRIMS Agreement.
See Building American Prosperity, supra note 54, at xii ("Recommendation 6: For-
eign Direct Investment Liberalization .... Forced technology transfer as a pre-
condition for foreign direct investment should be actively opposed by the U.S.
government.").
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sets of parties; they have a balancing interest in imposing moderate
discipline on the use of investment incentives against further
commitments to limit the use of performance requirements.
6.3.2.4. National Treatment and the Difficult Question of De
Facto Discrimination
A national treatment obligation in a WTO investment agree-
ment should clearly apply to regulatory measures that discriminate
on their face against foreign investors. The more difficult task is
figuring out how a national treatment norm in an investment
agreement should deal with de facto discriminatory measures. To
date, this issue has not received the attention it deserves in existing
institutional fora. Within NAFTA case law, the implications of the
operation of the national treatment norm have largely been over-
shadowed by analyses of the broad wording of the investment pro-
tection provisions in Articles 1105 (Minimum Standard) and 1110
(Expropriation). The primary focus of the interpretation issued by
the NAFTA Free Trade Commission was to limit the operation of
Article 1105. However, within the context of a proposed WTO in-
vestment agreement, it will be relatively easy to proscribe the op-
eration of investment protection provisions by carefully defining
their application. On a conceptual level, this is much more difficult
to do with the application of the national treatment norm. Thus,
this is where the WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment
should focus its efforts in the lead-up to the Mexico Ministerial
Conference.
While there is no ready and simple answer to this difficult is-
sue, there are two fundamental points that should be considered in
answering this question. First, protectionist intent (as discerned
through statements made by regulators) should not be enough to
constitute a finding of de facto discrimination. This was the path
taken in S.D. Myers and, as has long been recognized in WTO ju-
risprudence, is a path beset by dangers, particularly from a legiti-
macy perspective. Thus, as a second principle, the focus should be
on the discriminatory impact of the particular measure. In turn,
should it be enough to simply identify (rather than quantify) an
adverse impact on a foreign investor to ground claims breach of
the national treatment norm? This has long been the approach
within the GATT/WTO in the oft-stated principle that the focus of
GATT Article III on national treatment is to protect competitive
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opportunities and expectations.268 However, GATT Article 11.4 is
limited in its operation by the fact that national treatment is only
applied to "like products." Thus, the overall scope of Article III.4
is restricted by an analysis of whether two products are sufficiently
similar (whether in their physical characteristics or through other
criteria such as tariff classifications) to justify the application of the
national treatment norm. In contrast, the national treatment clause
in NAFTA Chapter 11 uses the formulation "in like circum-
stances," which, to date, has not been used by arbitral panels as a
means by which to draw some boundary around the operation of
that clause.269 Consequently, it is conceptually difficult to see any
real limit to the operation of a national treatment clause along the
lines of NAFTA Article 1102. Thus, it is suggested that attention
should be given in the WTO Working Group on the issue of quan-
tifying what level of adverse impact on a foreign investor is suffi-
cient to ground a claim of breach of national treatment. Again,
there is no simple or ready answer to this difficult question. But to
some degree, the answer may partly lie in providing guidance
(possibly in the form of interpretative note and careful drafting of
the "in like circumstances" qualification) to a panel considering the
application of a national treatment provision in a WTO investment
agreement. It is essential that a WTO panel considering the impact
of a given regulatory measure not approach its task with an as-
sumption of protectionism. This is a disturbing trend clearly evi-
26S See, e.g., Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Bev-
erages, WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4,1996), para. F
(The broad and fundamental purpose of Article M is to avoid protection-
ism in the application of internal tax and regulatory measures .... To-
ward this end, Article Ifi obliges Members of the WTO to provide equal-
ity of competitive conditions for imported products in relation to
domestic products... Moreover, it is irrelevant that the 'trade effects' of the
tax differential between imported and domestic products, as reflected in the vol-
ume of imports, are insignificant or even non-existent; Article III protects expec-
tations not of any particular trade volume but rather of the equal competitive re-
lationship between imported and domestic products.) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/distabase _e.htm
269 See North American Free Trade Agreement Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant
to Chapter Twenty, In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File no.
USA-MEX-98-2008-01, para. 7, Feb. 6, 2001 (adopting a narrow market access in-
terpretation of the phrase "in like circumstances" in the context of national treat-
ment for cross-border services under Article 1202 of NAFTA), available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/nafta/english/U98081ae.asp.
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dent in some of the NAFTA Chapter 11 cases.270 As previously
pointed out elsewhere, regulation of risk is a norm in the modem
regulatory state and not an inherently suspicious intervention in
free markets.271
6.3.3. Investment Protection: A Step Back
In devising clauses dealing with investment protection, nego-
tiators should bear in mind the contemporary environment sur-
rounding foreign investors and host states, particularly developing
states. Foreign investors are generally more interested in gaining
entry and freedom of operation in a host state rather than in pro-
tecting existing investments in recently de-colonized host states. In
other words, the emphasis in a WTO investment agreement should
be on investment liberalization rather than protectionism. This in-
terest has been bolstered by the problems that have arisen from the
overly broad NAFTA Chapter 11 protection provisions of Articles
1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment) and 1110 (Expropriation).
With this in mind, there are two proposals for the investment
protection provisions of a WTO investment agreement. First, ne-
gotiators should give careful thought to simply not including a
minimum standard of treatment clause along the lines of NAFTA
Article 1105. If the demandeur countries are successful in insisting
on including such a clause, then the negotiators should carefully
define the exact parameters of its application such as, for example,
guarantees of transparency and due process in domestic legal pro-
ceedings. In contrast, there is much greater justification in includ-
ing a clause along the lines of NAFTA Article 1110 guaranteeing
compensation in the event of expropriation. The scope of that pro-
tection, however, should be limited to direct expropriation. Nego-
tiators should strongly resist extending this standard of protection
to so-called creeping or indirect expropriation.
270 See In the Matter of an Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American
Free Trade Agreement Between Pope & Talbot, Inc. and the Government of Canada,
Award on the Merits of Phase 2, para. 70, Apr. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/AwardMerits-e.pdf.
We have already seen that it is not always clear whether a measure is a de
jure or de facto case, but even if it were, Canada has presented no reasons
to justify treating the two forms of disadvantage differently. Indeed, the
recognition that national treatment can be denied through de facto meas-
ures has always been based on an unwillingness to allow circumvention
of that right by skillful or evasive drafting.
271 Howse, supra note 98, at 156.
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6.3.4. Dispute Settlement
It is unlikely that the WTO negotiators will develop investor-
state dispute settlement procedures in a WTO agreement.272 In-
deed, if dispute settlement is limited to WTO member states, this
could possibly limit the potential for some of the NAFTA Chapter
11 difficulties as investors would not have a direct route in which
to challenge regulatory measures. But, as examined earlier in the
Article, there are strong normative justifications for the inclusion of
investor-state dispute resolution procedures. If the WTO negotia-
tors do decide to tackle this issue, the likelihood of recreating the
problems that have arisen in NAFTA will be reduced if the sub-
stantive provisions of a WTO investment agreement are carefully
delineated.
6.3.5. Investor Responsibilities
The theme of preferring the interests of foreign investors
(rather than focusing on their responsibilities) underlined much of
the NGO opposition to the MAI. This is a theme that should not be
simply rejected out of hand by WTO negotiators. For example,
consideration should be given to the approach taken late in the
MAI of the annexation of the OECD Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises to a WTO investment agreement.273 It is also clear that
NGO groups will once again push strongly for wording on the im-
pact of foreign investment on domestic environmental and labor
standards. On these issues, a degree of caution is warranted.
Clearly, developing states will most likely resist imposition in this
area as an unjustified attack on areas of legitimate comparative ad-
vantage. If the WTO negotiators decide to tackle these areas of
linkage, they would best be served by working within the tradi-
tional GATT/WTO formulation of negative integration (devising
disciplines on what member states should not do) rather than mov-
ing towards any suggestion of positive harmonization (imposing
272 In the lead-up to the Mexico Ministerial Conference, the Doha agenda
only countenances further work on the clarification of "consultation and the set-
tlement of disputes between Members." Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5,
at 22.
273 For a creative suggestion to counter the perception of bias in favor of in-
vestor rights, see TREBiLcOcK & HOWSE, supra note 46, at 366. The authors suggest
that, in a future investment agreement, the right to investor-state dispute settle-
ment could be conditioned on agreement by investors to abide by the OECD
Guidelines.
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positive obligations). In this vein, one possible approach is to in-
clude a provision requiring WTO members not to lower their labor
or environmental standards in order to attract investment. The
advantage of this approach is that it does not force WTO members
to adopt a particular standard of environmental or labor protection
but to simply not lower their chosen standards to attract foreign
investors. There is a similar provision in NAFTA. On a slightly
more ambitious note, such a commitment could even be framed to
build in some role for NGO oversight (just as in NAFTA side-
agreements on labor and environment) by creating a mechanism
that identifies countries that have dropped their domestic stan-
dards to attract foreign investors. Whilst this type of proposal will
no doubt provoke opposition amongst some WTO member states,
it would be an ideal opportunity in which to constructively harness
NGO expertise as well as possibly build NGO support for such a
WTO investment agreement.
7. CONCLUSION
The obstacles facing the successful conclusion of investment
negotiations in the WTO seem formidable. Since the end of the
Second World War, investment rules have largely been negotiated
at the bilateral and regional levels, in part due to the perceived re-
sistance of developing countries to the prospect of multilateral in-
vestment rules. However, the failure of the OECD MAI highlights
the fallacy that it is somehow easier to forge deep levels of liberali-
zation amongst developed countries.
There are two essential challenges that WTO members face in
negotiating investment rules in the WTO. First, a WTO agreement
must reflect the interests of developing countries. This will require
negotiators to think creatively, especially in order to avoid a MAI-
type scenario of simply replicating the very strong investment lib-
eralization and protection provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11. The
options for negotiation should not be perceived as a zero-sum
game, with either full liberalization of discriminatory regulation or
full protectionism. Given the political sensitivity of many invest-
ment restrictions, a WTO agreement will most likely have to consti-
tute a compromise with a mix of liberalization provisions whilst
preserving a degree of freedom to impose developmental restric-
tions. The last Section of the Article has put forward a series of
suggestions to be considered in implementing such a compromise,
including the architecture of the agreement and its impact on pre-
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admission restrictions, coverage of the damaging use of investment
incentives, and sensitivity to the use of some performance re-
quirements by host states.
Second, the WTO negotiatiors need to address some of the ju-
risprudence that has developed out of the NAFTA Chapter 11 case
law. This second challenge is possibly the more difficult one.
Many of these cases seem to represent an extension of the coverage
of NAFTA Chapter 11 beyond clearly discriminatory measures to
encompass seemingly legitimate regulations with little adverse
impact on foreign investors. In part, much of the case law derives
from the broad scope of the investment protection provisions in
NAFTA Chapter 11. The broad scope of these provisions seems
somewhat anachronous in the current international environment
where investors are more interested in gaining access and freedom
to operate in host states. As such, the WTO negotiators should
carefully consider the utility of overly strong and undefined in-
vestment protection provisions. A better approach would be to fo-
cus on granting protection from direct expropriation. However, by
itself, this approach will not solve all of the problematic tendencies
flowing from the NAFTA case law. The most difficult issue that
WTO negotiators will need to address is the way in which a na-
tional treatment norm should apply in an investment context. The
NAFTA experience and the MAI approach have followed the long-
standing practice in BITs of importing the national treatment norm
from GATT. However, little attention has been given to the poten-
tially broad application of the concept of de facto discrimination in
the investment context. It is essential that a WTO investment
agreement manage the task of delineating the coverage of de facto
discrimination in such a way as to preserve core components of
regulatory autonomy. The suggestions put forward in the final
Section of this Article are not intended to be exhaustive in this re-
spect. They are, however, an invitation to examine this difficult is-
sue further.
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